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Quick Decisions in Patent Cases 
PAUL R. GUGLIUZZA* 
Patent litigation is notoriously expensive and time consuming. In the past 
decade, however, patent law has changed in many ways that expedite resolution 
of infringement disputes. This Article identifies and evaluates this trend toward 
quick decisions in patent cases. Balancing the savings in litigation costs against 
the potential for error, the Article defends many recent and controversial 
developments, including the Supreme Court’s invigoration of the patent eligible 
subject matter requirement, the new administrative proceedings created by the 
America Invents Act, and changes in the requirements for pleading patent 
infringement. These developments permit defendants to obtain rulings of invalid­
ity or noninfringement before discovery begins, which was previously impos­
sible. Prediscovery rulings cost relatively little and can discourage low-merit 
litigation. But resolving complex questions of validity or infringement on a 
thin factual record may increase the risk of error, so the Article suggests 
additional reforms to help ensure that quick decisions are also accurate 
decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, the U.S. patent system has been transformed. Before 
Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, the validity of issued 
patents was decided almost exclusively in litigation in the federal courts. 
Although the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) offered proceedings to reexam­
ine a patent’s validity, those proceedings were not terribly popular, and they 
rarely ended in a decision of invalidity.1 Thanks to procedures created by the 
AIA, however, the number of filings at the PTO has doubled in the past few 
years, increasing from about a thousand per year as recently as 2010 to about 
two thousand per year today.2 
1. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 279–85 (2016) 
(providing an overview of post-issuance proceedings at the PTO). 
2. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/5Z7T-XAV9] [hereinafter EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KSL-K7PY] [hereinafter INTER PAR­
TES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., TRIAL 
Although there are many ways to parse the data, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987289 
2018] QUICK DECISIONS IN PATENT CASES 621 
STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 5 (Sept. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_ 
Stats_2017-09-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY75-5P56] [hereinafter PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS]. 
the new proceedings are perceived to invalidate patents much more frequently 
than those in place before the AIA.3 
The Supreme Court has changed patent law, too. Less than a decade ago, the 
patentable subject matter requirement of section 101 of the Patent Act was an 
afterthought, with the Court having suggested that “anything under the sun that 
is made by man” is eligible for patenting.4 In four decisions in the past seven 
years, however, the Court has invigorated the eligibility requirement, using it to 
invalidate patents on computer software,5 medical diagnostics,6 human gene 
sequences,7 and financial risk management techniques.8 
Other changes in patent law abound. To mention just a few: The Supreme 
Court has made it easier to invalidate a patent as obvious9 or indefinite,10 
increased courts’ discretion to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party,11 
and reworked the law of induced infringement.12 Congress adopted several 
other reforms in the AIA, including changing the rules for determining priority 
among competing patent applicants13 and limiting patentees’ ability to join 
multiple defendants in a single lawsuit.14 In addition, amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have heightened the pleading requirements in 
patent infringement cases.15 
See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 28 (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www. 
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL84-M7TC]; see also 
infra Section III.A.3 (discussing these amendments in more detail). 
Finally, for the past decade, patent litigation had 
been increasingly centralizing in a small number of judicial districts, most 
notably in the Eastern District of Texas,16 
3. For a detailed discussion of invalidity rates in both the new and old proceedings, see infra Section 
I.B. 
4. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
5. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
6. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
7. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
8. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
9. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
10. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
11. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
12. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringe-
ment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1025 (2016) (concluding that “[t]he net impact of” four recent 
decisions on induced infringement “generally favors patent holders, making it easier for them to 
demonstrate liability”). For an analysis questioning whether the Supreme Court’s recent changes to 
patent doctrine have significantly affected lower courts’ decision making and the behavior of partici­
pants in the patent system, see generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court 
Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 330 (2017). 
13. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011). 
14. Id. § 19(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 332–33. 
15. 
16. Brian Howard, 2015 End-of-Year Trends, LEX MACHINA (Jan. 7, 2016), https://lexmachina.com/lex­
machina-2015-end-of-year-trends [https://perma.cc/DN75-F7SP]. 
although a recent Supreme Court 
decision will likely reduce the concentration of cases by limiting plaintiffs’ 
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venue options in infringement suits.17 
These changes have been controversial. The former chief judge of the Federal 
Circuit famously complained that the Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) 
judges conducting the new AIA proceedings are “acting as death squads, killing 
[patent] rights.”18 
Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill, PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-n1717 
9879684 [https://perma.cc/EKF7-4GXH]. But see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRANSCRIPT OF 
PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 129 (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/ppac_transcript_20140814.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTV7-7R6Q] (remarks of James Smith, 
chief judge of the PTAB: “If we weren’t in part doing some ‘death squadding,’ we wouldn’t be doing 
what the statute calls us to do.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its 
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 251–57 (2015) (refuting the 
“death squad” claim and arguing that “many [challenged] claims deserve to die”). 
Many observers, including a past director of the PTO and 
another former chief judge of the Federal Circuit, have asserted that the 
eligibility requirement is threatening innovation by curbing the availability of 
patents.19 
Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court Saps Patent Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751, 
1752–54 (2014); Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr. 
12, 2016), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/783604 [https://perma.cc/6L5H-GYLG]. 
Influential interest groups have begun to lobby Congress to amend the 
Patent Act to weaken the eligibility requirement.20 
See Dennis Crouch, AIPLA On Board with Statutory Reform of 101, PATENTLYO (May 16, 2017), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/aipla-statutory-reform.html [https://perma.cc/WHK3-H59K] (dis­
cussing amendments proposed by the American Intellectual Property Law Association and the Intellec­
tual Property Owners Association). 
And, as this Article went to 
press, the Supreme Court was considering a case that could declare the AIA’s 
regime of administrative patent review to be unconstitutional,21 which would be 
a victory for those who perceive patent rights to be under assault. 
It is not only patent applicants and owners who are unhappy with the current 
state of the patent system. Companies that are frequently defendants in patent 
litigation are deeply concerned about the emergence of “patent trolls”—entities 
that make money not by selling products but by enforcing patents.22 Patent 
trolls provided a key impetus for the AIA23 
See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 1 (Apr. 
16, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42668.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2QR-KVHN]. 
and have led firms frequently 
accused of infringement to seek significant procedural changes to patent litiga­
tion, including heightened pleading requirements, cost-shifting in discovery, and 
mandatory awards of attorneys’ fees.24 Those frequent defendants were also 
leading voices urging the Supreme Court, in its recent venue decision, to restrict 
17. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). See generally 
Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 
1027 (2017) (providing an overview of patent venue law and the TC Heartland case). 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 639 F. App’x 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017) (considering whether the AIA’s inter partes review proceeding 
violates either Article III or the Seventh Amendment). 
22. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581 (2015). 
23. 
24. For an overview of recent legislative proposals, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation 
Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 283–87 
(2015). 
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plaintiffs’ ability to file suit in the patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas.25 
Countless scholarly articles have examined patent law’s many recent changes 
in isolation.26 This Article, by contrast, takes a holistic approach, identifying 
many of those changes as part of a trend toward quick decisions in disputes over 
patent infringement. The PTO’s new proceedings were, of course, explicitly 
designed to have expert decision makers adjudicate patent validity more effi­
ciently.27 But other changes that appear to be addressing infirmities in the 
substance of patent law also facilitate quick decisions. For example, the Su­
preme Court’s eligibility rulings are, on their face, designed to limit patent 
rights on basic research tools and longstanding business practices.28 Yet because 
lower courts usually treat patent eligibility as a question of law involving no 
disputed issues of fact, they are increasingly invalidating patents at early stages 
of litigation, including on prediscovery motions to dismiss. Such early validity 
decisions are, under prevailing Federal Circuit precedent, not available for other 
prerequisites of patentability, such as nonobviousness and adequate disclosure, 
which typically involve hotly disputed factual questions.29 Similarly, several 
recent modifications to the law of patent claim construction are ostensibly 
designed to narrow the scope of patent claims and provide better notice of their 
boundaries.30 But because claim construction is a task for the judge alone, not 
the jury, those modifications make it easier to resolve issues of validity and 
infringement on summary judgment, rather than forcing parties to endure the 
time and expense of a trial.31 Numerous other changes to both substantive 
patent law and the procedural law relevant to patent disputes fit this pattern of 
facilitating quick decisions, as explained in more detail below.32 
25. See, e.g., Brief for 48 Internet Cos., Retailers, & Ass’ns as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341). 
26. In addition to the sources cited throughout this Article, several journals have dedicated entire 
symposia to one development or another. For a small sample, see Bridging the Gap Between the 
Federal Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office, 23 B.U. J. SCI. &  TECH. L. 284, 284–455 (2017); 
Cracking the Code: Ongoing § 101 Patentability Concerns in Biotechnology and Computer Software, 
82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751, 1751–1906 (2014); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Proceedings, 24 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 301–429 (2017); Who Owns the Controlling Stake in Patent Law?, 66 AM. U. L.  
REV. 1015, 1015–1092 (2017). 
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011) (noting that the AIA “is designed to establish a more 
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and 
counterproductive litigation costs”). 
28. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We have ‘repeatedly 
emphasized [the] . . .  concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the 
future use of’ . . .  building blocks of human ingenuity.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 89 (2012))). 
29. See infra Section III.A.2. 
30. See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (making it 
easier to prove a patent claim invalid as indefinite); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (adopting a rule of claim construction that subjects more patents to a 
provision of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), that narrows claim scope). 
31. See infra Section III.B.1. 
32. See infra Part III. 
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Understanding patent law’s ongoing evolution as increasing speed to decision 
has several payoffs. Most obviously, it highlights how recent developments 
have the potential to decrease the costs of patent litigation by ending cases more 
quickly. Reduced litigation costs can, in turn, help remedy free-rider problems 
by encouraging more challenges to patent validity.33 Moreover, several of the 
new mechanisms of quick decisions provide routes to resolve patent disputes 
before discovery, which is when litigation costs begin to escalate significantly34 
and which is something patent law has never previously had. Lastly, swift 
dismissals of unmeritorious claims can incentivize greater ex ante respect for 
valid patents, making patents a stronger incentive for innovation.35 
But quick decisions also have downsides. To begin with, they may increase 
the risk of error. The eligibility requirement, for instance, allows courts to 
decide—often on the pleadings alone—the potentially fact-driven question of 
whether a patent contains an “inventive concept” as compared to the prior art. 
Also, litigation costs are not always low in cases that end quickly. The new PTO 
proceedings, for example, still cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.36 Further, 
PTO proceedings often proceed concurrently with litigation in court, resulting 
in wasteful procedural maneuvering and duplicative effort.37 Likewise, some 
mechanisms that appear to resolve patent disputes expeditiously, such as raised 
pleading standards, actually encourage more litigation about matters peripheral 
to the merits of the case.38 Finally, and most fundamentally, many of the recent 
changes in patent law that facilitate quicker decisions do so by favoring accused 
infringers. One might therefore worry that the trend toward quick decisions 
decreases the innovation incentives provided by patent rights. 
On balance, however, the trend seems to be a positive development. Many 
observers have recently expressed alarm about a proliferation of low-quality 
patents, that is, patents that provide poor notice of their boundaries, that are not 
particularly inventive, or both.39 This concern is particularly acute with regard 
to patentees (often referred to pejoratively as patent trolls) who use low-quality 
patents and the threat of litigation to extract settlements that appear excessive 
because, in many cases, the patentee probably would not have prevailed if the 
33. See infra Section I.A. 
34. See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 
199 (2015). 
35. See infra Section II.A (discussing in more detail how rules regarding the timing of adjudication 
can affect deterrence). See generally Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The 
Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 41 (2008) 
(exploring how early dismissals of low-merit claims “enhance the average quality or merit of lawsuits, 
which in turn enhances incentives to comply with the law”). 
36. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 43 (2017) (reporting 
average expenses of $100,000 through the filing of a petition, $275,000 through the end of the PTAB’s 
hearing, and $350,000 through appeal). 
37. See Peggy P. Ni, Rethinking Finality in the PTAB Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 557, 577 (2016). 
38. See infra Section III.A.3. 
39. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). 
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dispute had been litigated to a final judgment.40 Although the scope and 
existence of the “troll” problem is a matter of vigorous dispute,41 the salient 
point is that concerns about trolls highlight several weaknesses of the current 
patent system, including the large number of patents issued by the PTO that are 
probably invalid and the high cost of patent litigation.42 
Still, it is critical that the mechanisms providing speedy decisions avoid 
erroneously dismissing meritorious claims and operate at the lowest cost pos­
sible. Accordingly, throughout this Article, I highlight various ways in which 
the processes of the patent system could be improved to further increase 
accuracy and reduce costs. For instance, wasteful concurrent litigation in courts 
and at the PTO could be curtailed if both tribunals applied the same principles 
of claim construction and standards of proof, which would enable more PTO 
rulings to receive preclusive effect in the courts and vice versa.43 Also, courts 
might render more accurate decisions on patent eligibility if they recognized the 
doctrine’s factual underpinnings and properly applied the motion to dismiss 
framework created by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly44 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.45 That framework requires the judge to consider whether 
there is a plausible scenario in which the plaintiff could prevail, rather than 
simply ruling on the patent’s inventiveness without giving the patentee the 
benefit of the doubt on factual questions, which seems to be the prevailing 
practice. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides essential 
background on the processes of patent litigation in court and administrative 
review at the PTO. Part II sketches a framework, grounded in considerations 
about the social cost of litigation, for evaluating the optimal timing of decision 
in patent cases.46 It also situates recent changes in patent law within broader 
40. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.  
REV. 2117, 2126–28 (2013) (noting that certain trolls, so-called “bottom feeders,” are not particularly 
“concerned with the validity and scope of any given patent . . .  because they plan to settle before 
validity and infringement are determined”). 
41. See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
42. See Lauren H. Cohen et al., “Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent 
Litigation, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1807 (2017); see also Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case 
Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543, 548–49 (2014) (listing several “serious 
defects in the patent system” including the large number of poor-quality patents and the high cost of 
invalidating them). 
43. See infra Section III.A.1. 
44. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
45. 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see infra Section III.A.2. 
46. Few scholars have used the cost of patent litigation as a mechanism to explain and critique the 
substance of patent law, though this approach has been used in other areas of intellectual property 
doctrine. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 278–79 (1998) [hereinafter Bone, Trade Secret Law]; Robert G. 
Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2004); Douglas 
Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 687 (2003); William McGeveran, 
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 51–52 (2008); William McGeveran, The 
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2280 (2010) [hereinafter McGeveran, 
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trends in the law of civil procedure that favor early resolution of litigation. Part 
III presents the Article’s novel descriptive claim, conceptualizing numerous 
recent changes in patent law as part of a trend toward quick decisions. Drawing 
on the theoretical framework outlined in Part II, Part III also offers a prelimi­
nary defense of that trend and identifies several ways in which litigation-related 
costs could be further reduced and accuracy could be increased. Finally, Part IV 
looks to the future, arguing that current trends should not be dismissed as 
merely a backlash against the era of strong patent rights that began in the 1980s. 
Rather, by thinking critically about how to minimize costs related to enforcing 
patents, judges and policymakers can help moderate the often drastic swings in 
patent doctrine that occur between pro-patent and anti-patent eras. 
I. PATENT ADJUDICATION 
This Article focuses on what I call “patent adjudication,” meaning disputes 
involving patents that have already been issued by the PTO.47 Patent adjudica­
tion takes two basic forms: litigation in court and post-issuance review at the 
PTO.48 A primer on those processes, their costs, and their social welfare 
implications will aid in understanding the remainder of this Article. 
A. LITIGATION IN COURT 
Patent infringement lawsuits are the most common type of patent litigation in 
court. A patentee may file an infringement suit against anyone who “makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells” the patented invention, as well as anyone who 
imports the invention into the United States.49 In addition to those theories of 
direct infringement, the patentee may assert claims of indirect infringement 
against anyone who induces others to infringe the patent or who contributes to 
infringement by selling, offering to sell, or importing certain components of a 
patented invention.50 In response to an infringement suit, the accused infringer 
Trademark Fair Use Reform]. Similarly, although the Supreme Court has rarely mentioned litigation 
costs in its recent patent law opinions, see infra note 263, concerns about quick and inexpensive 
decisions have sometimes featured in Supreme Court opinions in other areas of intellectual property 
law. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2000) (rejecting a 
proposed test that would have allowed product design to sometimes be inherently distinctive under, and 
therefore automatically protected by, federal trademark law, noting that “[s]uch a test would rarely 
provide the basis for summary disposition of an anticompetitive strike suit”). 
47. Patent adjudication can be contrasted with pre-issuance examination proceedings. 
48. If an infringing product is imported into the United States, the patentee may also seek an 
exclusion order from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2012). 
I discuss ITC proceedings—which also facilitate quick decisions—in more detail below. See infra 
Section III.B.4. 
49. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010). 
50. Id. § 271(b)–(c). Section 271 contains several other more specialized acts of infringement 
involving pharmaceutical products, medical devices, the products of infringing processes, and the 
components of infringing products that are assembled abroad. For an overview of the various types of 
infringement outlined in section 271, see Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Conse­
quences of Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 502 n.20 (2012). 
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usually asserts both that it does not infringe the patent and that the patent is 
invalid.51 Rather than waiting to be sued for infringement, a potential infringer 
can instead file its own lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringe­
ment, invalidity, or both, provided that the potential infringer satisfies a standing 
requirement discussed in more detail below.52 
Patent litigation can conclude in many different ways, each with unique 
implications for social welfare. The vast majority of patent cases settle.53 After 
a settlement the patent remains in force, but the accused infringer usually 
receives a license to practice the patent. This result saves the parties and the 
court system the expense of continued litigation and typically allows the 
accused infringer to continue operating in the market, albeit usually subject to a 
royalty payment. As a strictly legal matter, however, the settlement binds only 
the parties to the case. 
Patent litigation can also conclude with a ruling of noninfringement or a 
ruling that the patent is not invalid and is infringed. Like a settlement, a ruling 
on the issue of infringement does not formally bind those who were not parties 
to the case, although the consequences for nonparties going forward can be 
significant. For instance, a patentee who proves infringement might obtain an 
injunction keeping a competitor out of the market, which could allow the 
patentee to raise prices. Moreover, some of the court’s interim legal rulings, 
such as its rulings on claim construction, can be persuasive or even binding in 
future litigation.54 A patentee may not, however, use a ruling that its patent is 
not invalid to bind newly accused infringers in future cases because principles 
of due process require that those defendants have the opportunity to personally 
litigate the invalidity defense.55 That said, the Federal Circuit has indicated that 
a prior decision in the patentee’s favor on the issue of validity should be given 
“weight” by a subsequent court even if that later litigation is against a different 
accused infringer.56 
51. An infringer can also argue that a patent is unenforceable for reasons grounded in equity, such as 
that the patentee obtained the patent by intentionally deceiving the PTO. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Because of the similarity between 
invalidity and unenforceability, I refer in the text solely to invalidity. 
52. See infra Section III.B.3. 
53. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259 
(2006) (“[A]pproximately 80% of patent cases settle.”); see also John R. Allison et. al., Patent Quality 
and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689 (2011) (reporting a settlement 
rate of 90.5% for the “most-litigated patents” and 84% for “once-litigated patents”). 
54. See e.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Techs., Inc., 772 F.3d 723, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that, 
under principles of issue preclusion, a nonparty may invoke a favorable claim construction order 
against the patentee in subsequent litigation). Even when preclusion does not apply, a prior construction 
of the patent’s claims can operate as persuasive authority or, if passed upon by the Federal Circuit, 
receive stare decisis effect. See Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
55. See Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710–11 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
56. See Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1569–70 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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A ruling of patent invalidity is the outcome of a patent case that can have the 
most significant impact going forward, both on the parties and on nonparties. 
Those consequences stem mainly from the doctrine of issue preclusion and, in 
particular, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Blonder-Tongue Laborato­
ries, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.57 In that case, the Court aban­
doned the so-called mutuality requirement, which prohibited anyone who was 
not a party to a prior case from relying upon the judgment, and held that once a 
litigant convinces a court to hold a particular patent invalid, any litigant accused 
of infringing the same patent in the future may use that invalidity decision as a 
complete defense.58 Thus, although a patentee may not use a ruling that its 
patent is not invalid offensively in a future case,59 an accused infringer may 
defensively use a prior ruling that a patent is invalid. 
Though Blonder-Tongue enables nonparties to benefit from rulings of invalid­
ity in later litigation,60 the decision also makes it likely that fewer rulings of 
invalidity will be produced than is socially optimal.61 Blonder-Tongue turns 
invalidity judgments into what economists call a public good, something that, 
like the information protected by intellectual property law itself, others cannot 
be excluded from using and whose use by one person does not reduce its 
availability to others.62 That is, an accused infringer who invalidates a patent 
does not internalize all the benefits of the invalidity decision.63 Rather, it shares 
those benefits with other potential infringers—quite often its own competitors— 
who may use the doctrine of nonmutual defensive issue preclusion to free-ride 
on its litigating efforts.64 
Several other features of patent litigation, in addition to Blonder-Tongue, 
nudge accused infringers away from a defense of invalidity and toward a 
57. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
58. Id. at 320–21, 349–50. 
59. See Stevenson, 713 F.2d at 710–11. 
60. Cf. Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1943, 
1961–62, 1993–94 (2016) (noting that, for the invalidation of a patent to increase market competition, 
several other conditions must be met). 
61. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 88–90 (2005). 
62. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating 
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 682, 687–88 (2004). One partial exception to the statement that 
invalidity judgments are public goods is in pharmaceutical patent litigation under the Hatch–Waxman 
Act, which allows a generic company that invalidates a patent to obtain a short period of regulatory 
exclusivity. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012); see also infra note 412 and accompanying text 
(discussing Hatch–Waxman exclusivity in more detail). This exclusivity period is specifically designed 
to overcome the public goods problem presented by Blonder-Tongue. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for 
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 
1605 (2006). 
63. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why 
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004). 
64. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 64–93 (2012) 
(discussing doctrinal and practical obstacles to patent challenges, in addition to the public goods issue). 
For a general discussion of public goods and of ways to solve free-rider problems, see Michael J. 
Meurer, Fair Division, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 966–67 (1999) (book review). 
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defense of noninfringement. For example, the burden of proving invalidity falls 
on the accused infringer, who must carry that burden by clear and convincing 
evidence.65 By contrast, it is the patentee’s burden to prove infringement, which 
it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.66 Moreover, an accused 
infringer will often have better information about its noninfringement defense 
than its invalidity defense.67 The infringement analysis typically turns on the 
operation of the defendant’s own product or process, whereas invalidity turns on 
information about the state of the art at the time of the invention, which is not as 
easy to obtain, at least before the early point in the case at which an infringer is 
required to disclose its invalidity contentions.68 Lastly, although nothing prohib­
its an accused infringer from trying to argue both invalidity and noninfringe­
ment, the claim construction process frequently forces the defendant to choose 
to argue for either a narrow construction, which will assist a noninfringement 
argument, or a broad construction, which will assist an invalidity argument. 
From the patentee’s perspective, Blonder-Tongue encourages settlement rather 
than litigation to a final judgment because one invalidity ruling permanently 
wipes out the patent.69 And, when the patentee decides to fight rather than settle, 
it will fight harder, raising the cost of litigation to the parties and to the public 
that funds the court system.70 Blonder-Tongue also exacerbates the error costs 
of an inaccurate decision of invalidity because the owners of those patents will 
not only pay their litigation expenses, “they also lose all future value from their 
patents.”71 In short, although Blonder-Tongue gives invalidity judgments more 
bite by allowing nonparties to rely on them, the decision’s overall impact on 
social welfare is unclear because it increases the costs imposed by the patent 
system in several ways. 
65. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). 
66. Bene v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 688 (1889). 
67. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 105 
(2013). 
68. Invalidity contentions are a filing that most district courts require in patent cases. They typically 
must identify each item of prior art that allegedly invalidates the patent, identify the grounds for 
invalidity established by each item of prior art, include a chart showing where in each item of prior art 
each element of each asserted patent claim is found, and explain any argument of invalidity for 
indefiniteness or lack of sufficient disclosure. See, e.g., E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 3-3. In many districts, 
invalidity contentions are due as few as fourteen days after the patentee discloses which patent claims it 
is asserting. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. PAT. R. 2.3; see also N.D. CAL. PAT. R. 3-3 (forty-five days after 
infringement contentions); E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 3-3 (same). 
69. See Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 
398–99 (2014). La Belle also discusses the role federal judges, as part of the more general move 
towards “managerial judging,” have played in encouraging settlement of patent litigation. Id. at 388–89, 
411–15. 
70. Of course, that increase in litigation costs will be somewhat offset by Blonder-Tongue’s 
reduction of future litigation, but that reduction will occur only if the initial litigation ends in a ruling of 
invalidity. And that ruling of invalidity is less likely precisely because of the incentive to fight harder 
that Blonder-Tongue creates. 
71. Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 651 
(2013). 
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In terms of the parties’ litigation expenses, patent cases can be comparable to 
the highest-stakes civil cases.72 According to widely cited numbers compiled by 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association, patent litigation pursued 
through an appeal costs half a million dollars for even the lowest-stakes case, 
and a case in which $25 million or more is at stake can cost upwards of $3 
million.73 A large component of the cost of patent litigation—half or more in a 
typical case—stems from discovery.74 The relatively high cost of discovery is 
often blamed on the “abusive” tactics of patent trolls,75 which has fueled recent 
legislative proposals to restrict the scope of discovery and shift discovery costs 
to the requesting party.76 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AT THE PTO 
The cost and complexity of patent litigation has long led scholars and 
policymakers to suggest that disputes over patent validity might be more 
efficiently resolved in administrative proceedings at the PTO.77 Congress cre­
ated the oldest such proceeding, ex parte reexamination, in 1980.78 In ex parte 
reexamination any person, though usually it is someone who has been accused 
of or sued for infringement, can file a petition challenging the validity of a 
patent based on other patents or on printed publications in prior art.79 If the 
petition raises a “substantial new question of patentability,”80 the PTO institutes 
reexamination and the petitioner is excluded from the process from that point 
forward.81 Although the PTO grants 92% of petitions to institute ex parte 
reexamination, the PTO rarely invalidates the patent.82 Rather, in 66% of 
instituted reexaminations, the patentee amends the patent’s claims to preserve 
validity.83 The PTO invalidates all of the challenged claims in only 12% of 
instituted proceedings.84 
To give requesting parties the opportunity to play a more active role in the 
administrative review process, Congress created inter partes reexamination in 
72. See Reilly, supra note 34, at 199. 
73. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 36, at 41. 
74. Reilly, supra note 34, at 198. 
75. Id. at 183. 
76. See Gugliuzza, supra note 24, at 285–86. 
77. See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation 
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 36–38 (1997). 
78. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–307 (2012). 
79. Id. §§ 301–302. The prior art is all the information relevant to a patent’s claim of novelty and 
nonobviousness. It includes the patents and printed publications that can provide the basis for ex parte 
reexamination (and, as discussed below, inter partes review), as well as prior sales and public uses of 
the invention. See id. §§ 102(a), 103. 
80. Id. § 303(a). 
81. See id. § 305. 
82. EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 2, at 1. 
83. Id. at 2. 
84. Id. 
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1999.85 Inter partes reexamination evolved into inter partes review in the 
America Invents Act.86 As explained in more detail below, inter partes review 
permits anyone who is not the patent owner to ask the PTO to reconsider 
whether the patent satisfies the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.87 
Although inter partes reexamination was mostly ignored,88 the new inter partes 
review proceeding has been extraordinarily popular, with over four thousand 
petitions filed in its first four-and-a-half years.89 
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., STATISTICS 10 (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AIA%20Statistics_March2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FH28-JRTP] [hereinafter PTAB STATISTICS]. 
There are several reasons for 
this popularity. First, the proceedings are trial-like. The challenger can make 
written submissions and participate in a hearing before the PTAB,90 an entity 
created by the AIA and composed of patent lawyers and former patent examin­
ers.91 Second, because of tight timelines imposed by the AIA, inter partes 
review concludes quickly, usually taking little more than a year.92 
The final but perhaps most important reason for the popularity of inter partes 
review is that challengers have won often. As of March 31, 2017, the PTAB had 
held all of the instituted claims unpatentable in 65% of proceedings to reach a 
final decision (1,029 of 1,577).93 There are, however, many ways to interpret 
that statistic. The PTAB declines to institute proceedings about 30% of the time, 
and the parties settle roughly one-third of proceedings.94 So, although the PTAB 
renders a ruling of invalidity in most of its final decisions, less than half of the 
patent claims that are initially challenged reach that stage. Of the 70,060 total 
claims challenged in inter partes review in the first four-and-a-half years of the 
proceeding’s existence, only 16,688 (24%) were ruled invalid.95 
In inter partes review, similar to ex parte reexamination, the only grounds for 
invalidity the challenger may present are anticipation (that is, lack of novelty) 
and obviousness, and the only prior art references the challenger may cite are 
patents and printed publications.96 But the AIA created two additional PTO 
85. Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 
1501. 
86. See America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 311, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011). 
87. See infra Section III.A.1. 
88. Among other reasons, the challenger’s right to participate was limited to filing written submis­
sions, the proceedings were perceived to be slow, and estoppel provisions required challengers to 
essentially choose to litigate validity either in reexamination or litigation in court. See KIMBERLY A. 
MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 1132–33 (4th ed. 2013). 
89. 
90. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012). 
91. See id. § 6(a). The PTAB consists of roughly 250 administrative patent judges and hears AIA 
post-issuance proceedings in three-judge panels. Although administrative patent judges often have 
experience as patent lawyers or examiners, the statute requires only that they “be persons of competent 
legal knowledge and scientific ability.” Id. 
92. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
93. PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 10. 
94. See id. 
95. Id. at 12. 
96. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
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proceedings that allow patentability challenges on any ground and based on any 
type of prior art: post-grant review and a temporary program for certain patents 
on business methods.97 Post-grant review is available only for patents with 
filing dates on or after March 16, 201398 and must be filed within nine months 
of patent issuance,99 so only seventy-eight petitions had been filed as of 
September 30, 2017.100 
The so-called covered business method review proceeding, which is available 
for patents that involve a “financial product or service,”101 has been more 
popular, with 524 petitions filed through September 30, 2017.102 Similar to inter 
partes review, the PTAB has held all of the instituted claims unpatentable in 
over 80% of proceedings to reach a final decision (132 of 162).103 
PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 11. The statistics reported in this sentence and the remainder 
of this paragraph are current through March 31, 2017. In April 2017, the PTO stopped reporting some 
of these detailed statistics in favor of a more summary report of AIA trial data. See generally AIA Trial 
Statistics, U.S. PAT. &  TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing­
patent-decisions/statistics/aia-trial-statistics [https://perma.cc/28XB-7CVU] (collecting the agency’s sta­
tistical reports on AIA proceedings). 
But the same 
caveats about that statistic apply because many proceedings settle or end with 
an institution-stage decision in favor of the patentee. Of the 8,762 claims 
challenged in covered business method review, only 2,357 (27%) have actually 
been invalidated.104 
The new administrative proceedings created by the AIA are a direct response 
to the high cost and long duration of patent litigation. The House Judiciary 
Committee report on the AIA explicitly states that the purpose of the new 
proceedings is to “provid[e] quick and cost effective alternatives to litiga­
tion.”105 Survey evidence indicates that inter partes review pursued through 
appeal costs about $350,000106—still expensive, but well below the average 
97. See id. §§ 321–329; America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 
(2011). The business method review proceeding is available only until September 15, 2020. America 
Invents Act § 18(a)(3). 
98. America Invents Act §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f). 
99. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). 
100. See PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 2. 
101. America Invents Act § 18(d)(1) (“‘[C]overed business method patent’ means a patent that 
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in 
the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service . . .  .”). For examples of 
Federal Circuit decisions elaborating on the statutory definition of patents that qualify for review in this 
proceeding, see Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (overturning 
a PTAB test that classified a patent as a covered business method patent if it “claim[ed] activities 
‘incidental to’ or ‘complementary to’ a financial activity”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 
793 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he definition of ‘covered business method patent’ is not 
limited to products and services of only the financial industry . . .  .”). 
102. PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 3. In terms of timing, the only restriction on covered 
business method review is that, for patents with filing dates on or after March 16, 2013, the nine-month 
window for seeking post-grant review must have expired, or any post-grant review must have 
concluded. America Invents Act § 18(a). 
103. 
104. PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 13. 
105. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 (2011). 
106. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 36, at 38. 
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cost of patent litigation in court.107 
The House report also justified the AIA based on the low quality of patents 
being issued by the PTO, asserting that an invigorated system of post-issuance 
review would “improv[e] patent quality and provid[e] a more efficient system 
for challenging patents that should not have issued.”108 The legislative history 
frames covered business method review in particular as a response to an 
abundance of “poor business-method patents” issued during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s that fueled a rise in “patent ‘troll’ lawsuits.”109 
II. TIMING PATENT ADJUDICATION 
To address concerns about patent trolls exploiting low-quality patents, we 
might also think about reforming the examination process to give applications 
greater scrutiny so those patents do not issue in the first place. But it would 
require an unfathomable expansion of PTO resources to more rigorously exam­
ine the nearly 500,000 applications the agency receives each year,110 and more 
rigorous examination may not be worth the investment given that only a small 
fraction of issued patents are ever enforced.111 Patent quality might also be 
improved by increasing filing fees at the PTO, which would discourage appli­
cants from seeking patents that are valuable only for extracting low-dollar 
settlements.112 But applicants will not always know the future value of their 
invention at the time of filing, raising the risk that higher fees could deter 
innovations that are unexpectedly valuable. 
In any case, an entirely ex ante solution to problems with patent quality 
seems unlikely. For starters, patent prosecutors are a cohesive lobbying group 
with a strong incentive to oppose any legal change that might diminish their 
professional opportunities, such as substantial increases in PTO fees.113 More­
over, litigators who assert patents—increasingly on a contingency fee basis114— 
have a vested interest in ensuring the wide availability of patents. Finally, 
regardless of any solutions adopted going forward, questionable patents that 
have already been issued will remain in force for a decade or more.115 Thus, as 
107. Id. at 37–38. 
108. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39–40. 
109. Id. at 54. 
110. See John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease,” 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
455, 487–89, 491 (2013). 
111. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1497 (2001). 
112. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 
679–80 (2012); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 
715 (2010). 
113. Masur, supra note 112, at 715 n.52. 
114. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L.  
REV. 335, 338 (2012). 
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (setting the patent term as twenty years from the date the 
application was filed). 
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the AIA illustrates, effective patent reform must also include post-issuance 
solutions. The emerging mechanisms of quick decisions identified in this Article 
offer a vital compromise, avoiding the downsides of closer or costlier examina­
tion ex ante but also improving the efficiency of litigation ex post. 
To set the stage for Part III’s exploration of those mechanisms, this Part 
begins by sketching a framework, grounded in considerations about the social 
cost of patent litigation, to help determine the optimal timing of adjudicating 
patent disputes. It then situates the recent move toward quick decisions in patent 
cases alongside broader developments in civil procedure that have facilitated 
fast resolution. 
A. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
Although many critiques of the patent system center on the behavior of 
so-called patent trolls (I will generally use the less pejorative term non­
practicing entity, or NPE), those entities’ effect on social welfare has been the 
subject of intense debate. Some evidence suggests that NPEs harm innova­
tion,116 
See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 4 (Harvard Bus. 
Sch. Fin. Working Paper No. 15-002, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2464303 [https://perma.cc/QUY 
7-VZN6]; Stephen Kiebzak et al., The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on 
Entrepreneurial Activity 3–4 (June 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2457611 [https://perma.cc/Z5ZG-4TFS]; Roger Smeets, Does Patent Litigation Reduce Corporate 
R&D? An Analysis of U.S. Public Firms 3–5 (Apr. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2443048 [https://perma.cc/S2UF-2UN7]. 
and a recent report by the Federal Trade Commission suggests that 
many NPEs are mainly interested in obtaining what the Commission character­
izes as “nuisance-value” settlements.117 
See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 101 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/p131203_ 
patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/96F3-RCTB]. But see Anne Layne-
Farrar, What Can the FTC’s §6(b) PAE Study Teach Us? A Practical Review of the Study’s Methodol­
ogy, Results, and Policy Recommendations 46 (Nov. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2885991 [https://perma.cc/8PUJ-8HDW] (noting that the FTC study provides little 
insight about whether the settlement amounts cited as evidence of nuisance litigation “properly reflect 
the value of the patents asserted”); Matthew L. Spitzer, Trolls, Nuisance Suits, and the FTC 3 (Nw. 
Univ. Pritzker Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Series, No. 17-14, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
3064104, [https://perma.cc/X7UA-QZ53] (critiquing the FTC’s report for using the pejorative phrase 
“nuisance suit” instead of the more neutral term, “Negative Expected Value (NEV) suit,” which can 
“mislead the reader into thinking that [the] suits are meritless”); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. 
Ginsburg, The FTC PAE Study: A Cautionary Tale About Making Unsupported Policy Recommenda­
tions 2 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 16-45, 2016), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2867110 [https://perma.cc/H2KW-6PTL] (asserting that the FTC’s sample was small and 
potentially unrepresentative). 
But NPEs have their defenders. They 
note that NPEs can facilitate innovation by helping individuals and small 
companies monetize inventions,118 and they criticize studies condemning NPEs 
both for overestimating the costs of NPE patent assertions119 and for placing too 
116. 
117. 
118. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 (2012). 
119. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Essay, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing 
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 433 (2014). 
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many patent owners in the NPE category.120 Without wading too deeply into 
that debate, I simply note that concerns about NPEs highlight arguably problem­
atic aspects of the patent system. Namely, many issued patents are probably 
invalid, and patent litigation can be expensive. Regardless of the labels affixed 
to particular plaintiffs, eliminating invalid patents and reducing litigation costs 
would improve the patent system. 
The standard economic view is that systems of dispute resolution should aim 
to minimize the social cost of litigation, which includes both process costs (that 
is, the parties’ private litigation costs plus the public cost of operating the 
system) and the error costs of over- or under-enforcing legal rights.121 Under 
this economic approach to legal decision making (sometimes termed “decision 
theory”122), process costs and error costs are inversely proportional. More 
intricate decision-making processes are more expensive but should yield fewer 
errors,123 and vice versa.124 
In practice, however, the relationship between process and error costs is not 
as neat as theory suggests. For example, in many patent cases, technologically 
complex questions—including questions of law about patent validity—are de­
cided by a jury. Jury trials are quite expensive to the parties, and the mere threat 
of a jury trial can increase the amount an accused infringer is willing to pay to 
settle a dispute.125 But there is little reason to think that the costlier decision-
making mechanism of the jury increases accuracy beyond what a judge would 
provide. Likewise, the new administrative review proceedings before expert 
judges at the PTAB have probably increased the accuracy of patent validity 
adjudications, but, as I explain below, costs have also increased substantially, 
and perhaps disproportionately, to any increase in accuracy.126 
Regardless of the precise relationship between process and error costs, the 
overarching normative aim remains to reduce those costs as much as possible. 
So one goal (though by no means the only goal) of the litigation system is to 
accurately identify low-merit suits, such as suits asserting patents that are likely 
invalid or that are filed against defendants who probably are not infringing, and 
to dispose of them at a low cost. If low-merit suits are not quickly and 
accurately identified, error costs increase and defendants who have not acted 
120. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Editorial, Framing the Patent Troll Debate, 24 EXPERT OPINION ON 
THERAPEUTIC PATS. 127, 127 (2014). 
121. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1973). 
122. See Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 178 & n.12 (citing 
additional literature). 
123. For present purposes, I define “error” by reference to whether a legal claim satisfies the 
requirements of governing doctrine. It is of course possible that those doctrines are suboptimal from a 
policy perspective. A primary purpose of Part III of this Article is to consider how possible law/policy 
misalignments affect a normative evaluation of quick decisions in patent cases. 
124. McGeveran, Trademark Fair Use Reform, supra note 46, at 2280. 
125. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 
1728–29 (2013) (exploring the consequences of eliminating jury trials in patent cases). 
126. See infra Section III.A.1. 
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unlawfully (as well as the public) are forced to bear the process costs of 
unjustified litigation. To be sure, those process costs might not actually be 
imposed in every case. A rational plaintiff might prefer to credibly threaten to 
impose those costs but not actually conduct the litigation, which is costly to the 
plaintiff, too. In the longer run, a system that regularly allows unmeritorious 
claims to proceed (giving bite to a plaintiff’s threat of costly litigation) can 
facilitate strike suits—or threats of suit—aimed at forcing quick settlements, 
which is precisely how many observers perceive the patent system to currently 
work.127 
From an ex ante perspective, if patentees can impose (or credibly threaten to 
impose) process costs on defendants regardless of the merit of their claims, the 
incentive to avoid infringement (say, by doing patent searches) is reduced 
because litigation would seem to be inevitable—an error cost resulting in 
underdeterrence of patent infringement.128 If process costs are sufficiently large, 
those defendants may avoid the activities that led them to become litigation 
targets in the first place—an error cost resulting in overdeterrence by subjecting 
noninfringing activity to litigation or threatened litigation.129 
See Hylton, supra note 35, at 46 (discussing the relationship between the social cost of 
litigation and deterrence). Some might suggest that, in the patent system at least, the risk of market exit 
is more theoretical than real. Cf. Richard Lloyd, The Biggest US Patent Litigation Targets See a Big 
Drop Off in Cases in 2016, IAM (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g= 
5e24b330-d605-4055-9189-a6aaf87c593e [https://perma.cc/55HA-UJDL] (reporting Apple, Samsung, 
and Amazon as being among the top five patent infringement defendants). 
In addition to providing mechanisms for defendants to obtain quick and 
inexpensive decisions in cases involving low-merit claims, it is also imperative 
to render accurate decisions. Only those claims that are actually low merit 
under governing law should be dismissed, and meritorious claims should pro­
ceed to final resolution as efficiently as possible.130 But it can be difficult to 
achieve speed, low costs, and high accuracy when the underlying legal doctrines 
involve complex and fact-intensive questions.131 Unfortunately, this is largely 
the case in patent law. For example, nonobviousness,132 “the sine qua non of 
127. See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 117, at 8–9. 
128. The content of patent law itself can also affect the incentive to search. Notably, an accused 
infringer that performs a good faith pre-infringement search will probably avoid the enhanced damages 
that can follow a finding of willful infringement. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
1923, 1932 (2016). 
129. 
130. This is not to say that the legal system should strive for perfect accuracy; increases in accuracy 
are usually accompanied by increases in litigation costs and time to final adjudication. See A.A.S. 
Zuckerman, Quality and Economy in Civil Procedure: The Case for Commuting Correct Judgments for 
Timely Judgments, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 378 (1994) (“[I]n some cases maximal accuracy, in 
the sense of a decision reached after employing the full panoply of procedural devices, is inimical to 
timely justice, in the sense of rendering a decision before its utility has seriously declined through the 
passage of time.”). 
131. See Bone, Trade Secret Law, supra note 46, at 279. 
132. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
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patentability,”133 is a fact-intensive inquiry into the scope and content of the 
prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, the 
level of ordinary skill in the art, and “secondary considerations” such as 
commercial success and failure of others.134 Other key grounds of patent 
validity—most notably novelty135 and enablement136—are likewise heavily fact 
dependent.137 Infringement, too, is a question of fact that typically cannot be 
resolved until claim construction occurs,138 which is usually during or after 
discovery.139 Likewise, remedial doctrines in patent law are notoriously open-
ended and fact-specific. Prime examples include the fifteen-factor test applied to 
determine a reasonable royalty for patent infringement140 and the discretionary 
standard for determining willful infringement.141 Lastly, and even setting aside 
the fact-intensive nature of key patent law doctrines, the accused infringer’s 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial makes it difficult for a court to enter a 
quick, litigation-ending decision in favor of the patentee.142 
The upshot is that many patent cases are not amenable to quick, low-cost 
resolution. Despite the Federal Circuit’s oft-discussed penchant for adopting 
bright-line rules as opposed to fuzzy standards,143 the key grounds on which 
most patent cases are decided require an investigation into the unique facts of 
that particular case. That holds true regardless of whether the governing doc­
trine looks like a rule or a standard, meaning that any preference for bright-line 
rules among the Federal Circuit judges does not necessarily translate to quicker 
or cheaper adjudication.144 Although many important issues can be resolved on 
133. Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1005 (1976) (White, J., dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari). 
134. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
135. A patent lacks novelty if all of its limitations are found in a single prior art reference. See 35 
U.S.C. § 102(a). Obviousness, by contrast, is a finding that an invention does not possess the required 
originality even though the invention is not identically disclosed in a single reference. See id. § 103. 
136. See id. § 112(a) (requiring the patent to include “a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to  make and use the same”). 
137. Novelty is a question of fact, requiring the fact-finder to compare the patent claim to the 
allegedly anticipating prior art reference. See Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). Enablement, like obviousness, is a legal question that turns on subsidiary questions of 
fact about the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art to recreate the patented invention without 
undue experimentation. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1573 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
138. See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
139. See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-5 (3d ed. 2016). 
140. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
141. See infra notes 425–30 and accompanying text. 
142. Cf. Lemley, supra note 125, at 1719–20 (arguing that “the legal support for [a Seventh 
Amendment jury trial right in patent cases] is far from airtight”). 
143. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773 
(2003). 
144. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 596 
(1992) (casting doubt on the common assumption “that standards tend to be complex in operation 
compared to the rules that might replace them”). 
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summary judgment, by then the parties will have proceeded through discovery, 
the most expensive phase of the litigation. 
Remarkably, despite the rich literature on the economics of civil proce­
dure,145 little of that writing focuses on interim court decisions in litigation, 
such as rulings on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.146 In 
one important exception, Keith Hylton has modeled the choice between using 
pleading standards versus summary judgment as a screening device.147 He 
argues that the rigor of pleading standards should vary based on how difficult it 
is to satisfy the underlying rule of substantive law and on the social cost of the 
relevant litigation.148 This explains, in Hylton’s view, why the law imposes 
heightened pleading standards for claims such as fraud,149 which are “difficult 
to prove and impose[] substantial social costs beyond litigation expenses,” such 
as reputational harm.150 Hylton emphasizes that early dismissals are particularly 
important for claims that are unlikely to succeed on the merits.151 Dismissing 
those claims before they impose significant costs (for instance, on a motion to 
dismiss rather than at summary judgment) can enhance defendants’ incentives 
to comply with the law because they will know that claims challenging lawful 
conduct will be disposed of at minimal cost.152 Early dismissals of low-merit 
claims also, of course, discourage plaintiffs from using litigation to obtain 
settlements that are unwarranted given the weakness of the claim. 
Louis Kaplow, in his pathmarking work on multistage adjudication, empha­
sizes that the decision whether to continue or terminate a case requires balanc­
ing three factors: the increased deterrence that stems from continuation, the 
possibility that continuation will chill benign acts, and the increased process 
costs from continuation.153 Those considerations vary considerably in different 
areas of law and even from one case to another. Their interactions are particu­
larly complex when adjudication is expensive, as it is in patent cases. The high 
costs of litigation favor earlier termination,154 but those costs can also serve a 
deterrence function ex ante.155 Thus, as Kaplow acknowledges, “implementa­
145. For an accessible introduction, see ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003). 
146. See Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (2013) (identifying 
this gap in the literature). 
147. See Hylton, supra note 35. 
148. Id. at 62. 
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
150. Hylton, supra note 35, at 41–42. 
151. Id. at 41.  
152. See id. 
153. Kaplow, supra note 146, at 1296. 
154. Louis Kaplow, Optimal Multistage Adjudication, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 613, 616 (2017). 
Kaplow suggests that, because adjudication costs become sunk as a case moves toward later stages, 
screening rules should be more stringent at earlier stages than at later stages. See id. at 644. This 
argument challenges the prevailing practice of relatively lax screening rules at the outset of a case (for 
example, on a motion to dismiss) with more stringent rules applying as the case proceeds through 
summary judgment and trial. 
155. Id. at 616. 
2018] QUICK DECISIONS IN PATENT CASES 639 
tion of an optimal approach requires [difficult] contextual judgments by legal 
decisionmakers.”156 
In this Article, I try to provide such a contextual analysis grounded in the law 
of patents and the process of patent litigation. As a positive matter, this analysis 
shows how numerous recent changes in patent law can be conceptualized as 
efforts to reduce process costs by resolving patent cases at an earlier stage 
without significantly increasing the risk of erroneous decisions. As a normative 
matter, widespread concerns about low-merit infringement claims and the high 
cost of patent litigation suggest that providing quick decisions is a reasonable 
goal. But not all quick decisions are cheap, and quick decisions might be 
erroneous, so there are many nuances and complications to explore. 
B. QUICK DECISIONS IN CONTEXT 
Before commencing that analysis, it is worth noting that the move toward 
quick resolution is not unique to patent law. As has been well documented, the 
civil trial has been disappearing from American courtrooms for nearly a century. 
In the 1930s, roughly 20% of federal civil cases ended with a trial.157 Today that 
number is less than 2%.158 The disappearance of the trial reflects a trend toward 
settlement that has been influenced by numerous factors, including the pre-trial 
fact development permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the grow­
ing importance of institutional litigants who participate in litigation with a view 
toward long-term interests, and the emergence of judicial case management, in 
which the judge’s function is mainly to facilitate settlement.159 
Developments in the law of civil procedure reflect a trend not just toward 
early settlement but early decisions. In three famous cases decided in 1986, the 
Supreme Court made clear that courts should freely use summary judgment to 
resolve cases before trial.160 More recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, the Court made it easier to dismiss complaints at the pleading 
stage by requiring plaintiffs to include in the complaint “factual allegations” 
that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”161 This plausibility standard 
was previously found in the Court’s summary judgment case law,162 and 
156. Kaplow, supra note 146, at 1189–90. 
157. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L.  
REV. 631, 633 n.3. 
158. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 (2004) (reporting that trials 
accounted for 1.8% of dispositions in 2002). 
159. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 
522, 544–66 (2012). 
160. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 
(1986). 
161. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 
(2007). 
162. See, e.g., Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596 (“[T]he absence of any plausible motive to engage in the 
conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a ‘genuine issue for trial’ exists within the meaning of 
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plausibility analysis makes a motion to dismiss resemble a quick-look decision 
on the merits.163 Numerous other recent developments also facilitate speedy 
resolution, including Supreme Court decisions that make it easier for defendants 
to defeat class actions at the certification stage,164 that make it easier for 
government officials to establish qualified immunity on summary judgment,165 
and that embrace alternative dispute resolution,166 which is perceived to resolve 
disputes with greater speed and at lower cost. 
The move toward quick decisions in patent cases is in some ways situated 
within these broader trends. For example, the Supreme Court’s summary judg­
ment trilogy facilitated the increased granting of those motions on the issue of 
infringement.167 Twombly and Iqbal, coupled with amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, have made it easier for courts in patent cases to grant 
prediscovery motions to dismiss.168 Policy discussions of patent litigation regu­
larly invoke tropes about abusive and frivolous lawsuits—the same rhetoric that 
has pervaded policy discussions of civil litigation generally.169 And many 
(though not all) of the changes to patent law favor defendants, much like the 
recent changes in civil procedure.170 
Yet other aspects of the move toward quick decisions in patent cases are 
unique to patent law. For example, changes in substantive patent doctrine, such 
as the law of patent eligibility, the rules of claim construction, and the doctrine 
of nonobviousness, have played key roles in opening procedural routes to quick 
decisions.171 
For a general discussion of the move toward “substance specific procedure” in federal litiga­
tion, see Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design 63–68 (Aug. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript). 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3013961[https://perma.cc/ENJ3-3NCR]. 
Moreover, unlike in civil procedure, where the Supreme Court is 
often explicit about its motivation of protecting parties (particularly defendants) 
from the expense of litigation,172 the Court rarely mentions litigation costs 
Rule 56(e).”); see also Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss 
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 29–30 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
established standards for summary judgment and for the motion to dismiss that are substantially the 
same . . . .  [U]nder both standards, a court determines the plausibility of the claim.”). 
163. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 (2010). 
164. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
165. See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 
139, 148–49 (discussing cases that “dramatically expanded the immunity defense and made it more 
likely that defendants would prevail before trial” (footnote omitted)). 
166. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
167. See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, Across Five Eras: Patent Validity and Infringement 
Rates in U.S. Courts, 1929–2006, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 454, 479 (2016). 
168. See infra Section III.A.3. 
169. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1543, 1598–99 (2014). 
170. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 304 (2013). 
171. 
172. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (describing 
“the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to 
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when justifying its decisions in patent cases.173 Thus, although current trends in 
patent litigation are consistent with broader developments in civil procedure, 
they are sufficiently unique to warrant independent analysis. 
III. TOWARD QUICK DECISIONS IN PATENT CASES 
This Part sets out the Article’s core descriptive claim, showing how numerous 
recent changes in patent law facilitate quicker and potentially lower-cost deci­
sions in patent infringement disputes. It also offers a preliminary normative 
evaluation of those changes, balancing gains in speed and cost savings against 
potential losses in accuracy. 
A. PREDISCOVERY DECISIONS 
I focus initially on legal changes that enable prediscovery resolution of patent 
litigation because those developments offer the greatest potential for cost 
savings.174 
In addition to examining the stage at which a case was resolved, there are other methods of 
estimating litigation costs, such as counting the number of docket entries, party motions, judicial 
orders, or hearings. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Endogenous Litigation Costs: An 
Empirical Analysis of Patent Disputes 3 (Nw. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 17-01, Univ. of Ill. 
Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-14, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2893503 
[https://perma.cc/UL2Q-LYAV]. But the stage of resolution provides a rough proxy for overall costs, 
which is sufficient for my purposes. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 146, at 1189–90 (using stage of 
resolution in a cost–benefit analysis of adjudication timing). 
1. Post-Issuance Review at the PTO 
The new administrative proceedings created by the AIA are the most obvious 
examples of a move toward resolving patent disputes before the parties incur 
significant expenses. The AIA itself imposes rigorous timing requirements. For 
example, an accused infringer who wishes to pursue inter partes review must do 
so within one year of being sued for infringement,175 and AIA proceedings must 
conclude within one year of the PTAB’s decision to institute review.176 On 
average, AIA proceedings take fifteen months from filing the petition (on which 
the PTAB bases its decision to institute review) to final decision.177 By compari­
son, the duration of patent litigation from filing to disposition via trial or 
choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
558 (2007) (“[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of 
discovery but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.” (citation 
omitted)). 
173. See infra note 263. 
174. 
175. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012). 
176. Id. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11); 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(c) (2012). The PTAB can extend this deadline 
up to six months with good cause. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
177. Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U.  
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 99 (2014). 
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summary judgment is usually over two-and-a-half years.178 
These expedited proceedings at the PTO, which address only the issue of 
validity, help mitigate incentives that exist in litigation to argue for noninfringe­
ment or to settle because they are fast, cheap, and conclude more quickly than 
litigation. Moreover, unlike in litigation between private parties, the PTAB can 
continue to review the patent’s validity even after the parties settle.179 This 
occurs most commonly when the parties settle late in the proceedings.180 The 
PTAB has also said it will decline to terminate proceedings when the challenged 
claims are “clearly . . .  unpatentable,”181 and it has refused to terminate 
proceedings when infringement litigation is pending against defendants who are 
not parties to the PTAB settlement.182 
Yet the existence of concurrent litigation can undermine the cost savings 
provided by the PTO’s fast proceedings. Nearly 90% of patents involved in AIA 
proceedings are also involved in litigation.183 Simultaneous proceedings can 
facilitate duplicative litigation, produce uncertainty about a patent’s status as 
valid or invalid, and incentivize wasteful procedural maneuvering. In part 
because the courts and the PTO apply different standards of proof and rules of 
claim construction (for reasons I will explain shortly), the federal courts in 
several recent cases have rejected challenges to a patent’s validity but the PTO 
has subsequently found the same patent to be invalid.184 The Federal Circuit has 
178. Jonathan H. Ashtor, Opening Pandora’s Box: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Patent Litiga-
tion, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 227 (2016). 
179. 35 U.S.C. §§ 317(a), 327(a). 
180. See, e.g., Blackberry Corp. v. Mobilemedia Ideas LLC, No. IPR2013-00016 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 
2013) (declining to terminate inter partes review when the parties settled seven months after institution, 
one day before a scheduled hearing); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 
1272 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that the court granted the challenger’s motion to withdraw as appellee 
pursuant to a settlement agreement), aff’d sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 
(2016). 
181. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,648 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
182. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. CreateAds LLC, No. IPR2014-00200, 2015 WL 1009199 (P.T.A.B. 
Feb. 26, 2015) (refusing to terminate a proceeding when more than ten other cases alleging infringe­
ment of the same patent were pending against other defendants). 
183. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court 
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 69 (2016). 
184. See, e.g., Tinnus Enters., LLC v. Telebrands Corp., 846 F.3d 1190, 1202 n.7, 1208 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (affirming preliminary injunction even though the PTAB had found the patent to be invalid; 
the district court eventually stayed the case after more than a year of litigation, see Tinnus Enters., LLC 
v. Telebrands Corp., No. 6:15-cv-551, 2017 WL 379471, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017)); Apple Inc. 
v. Smartflash LLC, No. CBM2015-00028, 2016 WL 3035555 (P.T.A.B. May 26, 2016) (PTAB 
issuing final written decision finding patent to be invalid over a year after a jury returned a verdict in 
the patentee’s favor on infringement and validity, see Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-cv-447, 
2015 WL 11089752 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2015); see also Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App’x 
977, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (invalidating the asserted patents on appeal from the district court’s 
judgment)); Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-01512, 2016 WL 4466973, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. June 15, 2016) (patent invalidated in ex parte reexamination after the Federal Circuit 
affirmed court rulings in the patentee’s favor on validity and infringement and remanded for a new trial 
on damages); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 554 n.18 (D. Del. 
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attempted to address the problem of differing court and PTO decisions on 
validity with a bright-line “absolute finality” rule, holding that the first proceed­
ing to reach an irrevocably final decision controls.185 That rule encourages 
parties to race to a quick, final decision when a court and the PTO reach 
different conclusions.186 But that race will occur between the same parties in 
two different proceedings, meaning that the existence of PTO review probably 
does not result in any savings in litigation costs. Indeed, it may increase 
them.187 
To be sure, in the mine-run of cases, district courts stay litigation before the 
possibility of divergent rulings arises.188 In fact, the portion of the AIA that 
created the covered business method review program contains a special provi­
sion that supporters of the AIA believed would place a “heavy thumb on the 
scale in favor of a stay.”189 Though a stay extends the duration of a court case, if 
the PTAB invalidates the asserted patents, the stay can result in the litigation 
2016) (denying motion to stay even though the PTAB had invalidated some of the asserted patent 
claims, noting that “[w]hile the PTAB has ruled the relevant claims invalid, should the Federal Circuit 
overturn the PTAB, addressing these additional grounds at trial is more efficient than having to try 
invalidity on these grounds at a much later date”); Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 12-cv-499, 
2015 WL 10677197 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2015) (jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on an infringement 
claim; the asserted patents were later invalidated by the PTAB, see Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, No. 
IPR2014-00904, 2015 WL 8536745 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2015), aff’d, 685 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 
2017); Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, No. IPR2014-00875, 2015 WL 7695188 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 
2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 681 F. App’x 885 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); Ultratec, Inc. 
v. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., No. 13-CV-346, 2015 WL 2248437 (W.D. Wis. May 13, 2015) (PTAB 
issued final written decision invaliding the patents-in-suit roughly six months after the jury returned a 
verdict in the patentee’s favor), appeal dismissed, 611 F. App’x 720 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Pers. Audio LLC 
v. CBS Corp., No. 2:13-cv-270, 2014 WL 7741716 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2014) (jury verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff on an infringement claim; the asserted patent was later invalidated by the PTAB, see Elec. 
Frontier Found. v. Pers. Audio LLC, No. IPR2014-00070, 2014 WL 8584938 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014), 
aff’d, 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
185. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 295–305 (discussing ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015), Versata Comput. Indus. Sols, Inc. v. SAP AG, 564 F. App’x 600 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 
and Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
186. See, e.g., id. at 300 (discussing the procedural history of Versata, 564 F. App’x 600). 
187. For a critique of the absolute finality rule that raises concerns about litigation costs, see ePlus, 
Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., dissenting from the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“After an expensive, multi-year litigation with a full trial 
which Defendant lost, it ought not to be able to turn around and rely on the PTO to undo the prior 
district court litigation. To allow this encourages defendants to scrap and fight to keep underlying 
litigation pending in the hope that they will fare better with the PTO and then be able to unravel the 
district court judgment against them.” (footnote omitted)). 
188. See, e.g., Love & Ambwani, supra note 177, at 96, 103 (reporting that, for inter partes review 
petitions filed between September 2012 and March 2014, district courts granted roughly 80% of 
motions seeking a stay pending an instituted review). 
189. 157 CONG. REC. S1363–65 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (remarks of Sen. Schumer) (describing 
America Invents Act section 18(b)(1)(D), which directs courts to consider whether a stay “will reduce 
the burden of litigation”—something a stay, by definition, will always do); see Jonathan Stroud et al., 
Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-Grant 
Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 241 (2015) 
(reporting that district courts have denied with prejudice less than 20% of motions seeking a stay 
pending instituted covered business method review). 
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being resolved relatively cheaply even though it was technically pending for a 
year or more.190
But a stay of litigation is not guaranteed. Courts commonly deny stays if the 
accused infringer delays petitioning the PTO,191 if there are patent claims in the 
litigation on which the PTO has not instituted review,192 if there are non-patent 
claims in the complaint,193 or if the parties are direct competitors in the 
market.194 Stay practices also vary significantly among the federal district 
courts. The Eastern District of Texas, which, before the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision changing the law of venue in patent cases,195 handled over 40% of all 
patent cases filed nationwide,196 
Dennis Crouch, The Concentrated Market of Patent Jurisdictions, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/concentrated-patent-jurisdictions.html [https://perma.cc/K93N­
6U76]. 
denied over 40% of stay motions between 
January 2014 and July 2016. By comparison, the Northern District of California 
denied only about 20% of stay motions during that period.197 
Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the 
Eastern District of Texas, 2017 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 27;  see MORGAN LEWIS, 2017 PTAB DIGEST: THE 
LATEST TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 28 (2017), https://www.morganlewis. 
com/media/files/publication/report/ptab%20post%20grant%20proceedings_fin_screen.ashx?la=en 
[https://perma.cc/Q6JE-27CT] (reporting that the Northern District of Illinois and the Northern District 
of California are the most likely to grant a contested motion to stay pending inter partes review, with 
grant rates of 82% and 74%, respectively, and that the Eastern District of Texas is among the least 
likely to grant a contested motion to stay, with a grant rate of 25%). 
In short, although AIA proceedings can be quick and cheap standing alone, 
they sometimes add another layer of costs to already-expensive patent disputes. 
Duplication of litigation can occur because court decisions have almost no 
preclusive effect at the PTO and vice versa. The Supreme Court, in a trademark 
case, recently confirmed that preclusion between the courts and the PTO can be 
appropriate, but the two forums must be applying the same legal standard for 
preclusion to apply.198 In patent proceedings, although the courts and the PTO 
are deciding the same question—does the patent satisfy the requirements of the 
Patent Act?—the legal standards differ. In court, patent claims are construed 
190. See Doug Lichtman, Patient Patents: Can Certain Types of Patent Litigation Be Beneficially 
Delayed?, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 430 (2017) (describing the benefits of delaying litigation to allow the 
PTO to issue a decision that is “first in time and hence . . .  binding on later [court] proceedings”). 
191. See, e.g., Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031, 
1035 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (denying a stay when the accused infringer “did not file its inter partes review 
petitions until almost a year after being served with the complaint”). 
192. See, e.g., Tire Hanger Corp. v. Mr. Car Guy Concierge Serv. Inc., No. 5:14-cv-00549, 2015 WL 
857888, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015). 
193. See, e.g., Nippon Steel & Sumito Metal Corp. v. POSCO, No. 12-2429, 2013 WL 1867042, at 
*7, *10 (D.N.J. May 2, 2013) (denying a stay pending inter partes reexamination in a case involving 
both patent and unfair competition claims). But cf. Delphix Corp. v. Actifio, Inc., No. 13-cv-04613, 
2014 WL 6068407, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014) (granting a partial stay in a case involving both 
patent and trade secret claims). 
194. See, e.g., Courtesy Prods., L.L.C. v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., Civ. No. 13-2012, 2015 WL 
5145526, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 1, 2015). 
195. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
196. 
197. 
198. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299, 1303 (2015). 
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consistent with their usual meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art,199 
and the patent challenger must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evi­
dence.200 The PTO, by contrast, gives patent claims their broadest reasonable 
interpretation,201 and invalidity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.202 
To be clear, a final, case-ending decision that a patent is invalid, either by a 
court or by the PTO, does bind its counterpart; that is the upshot of the absolute 
finality rule discussed above.203 But many decisions that would be entitled to 
preclusive effect, at least between the same parties, if the PTO and the courts 
were applying the same legal standard receive no preclusive effect at all, 
including a ruling in the patentee’s favor on the issue of validity, a ruling of 
invalidity in a dispute that has not yet fully concluded, and any ruling on claim 
construction.204 Moreover, although estoppel provisions in the AIA bar petition­
ers from reasserting in court particular invalidity arguments they made or could 
have made at the PTAB,205 some courts have interpreted those provisions 
narrowly, applying them only to arguments on which the PTAB actually insti­
tuted review.206 
By staying litigation pending PTO review in most cases, the courts have 
attempted to make the current system as efficient as they can. Any change to 
more effectively coordinate court and PTO proceedings would probably have to 
199. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
200. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). This heightened standard of proof is 
imposed because of the statutory presumption of patent validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
201. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2012); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2142 (2016) (approving under Chevron the PTO regulation adopting the broadest reasonable interpreta­
tion standard) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The 
rationale for the broader interpretation standard is that patents can be amended in proceedings at the 
PTO. See infra notes 209–15 and accompanying text (questioning whether that rationale applies in AIA 
proceedings, where amendments are relatively difficult to obtain). 
202. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The standard of proof is lower at 
the PTO than in court because the statutory presumption of validity—a form of deference to the 
agency’s decision making, see infra note 216—does not apply when the agency is making its own 
decision about patentability. 
203. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. A court decision of invalidity also binds the ITC in 
section 337 proceedings, see supra note 48, but ITC decisions do not bind the courts in subsequent 
litigation. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. 
L. REV. 529, 558, 561–63 (2009). 
204. See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 289 (discussing how the different legal standards 
applied by the courts and the PTO minimize the preclusive effect of those tribunals’ rulings). But see 
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact on Claim Construction, 24  
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 332 (2016) (suggesting, based on the similarities between PTAB proceed­
ings and district court litigation, that PTAB claim constructions could be entitled to preclusive effect in 
district court litigation, and vice versa). 
205. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2). 
206. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 
2016) (citing Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But 
see Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13-cv-1015, 2017 WL 2526231, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 
2017) (applying estoppel to grounds included in a petition for inter partes review but determined by the 
PTAB not to establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability, discussing conflicting district court 
decisions on the scope of estoppel). 
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come from Congress. One option would be to have the courts and the PTO 
apply the same standards of claim construction and burdens of proof, to enhance 
the preclusive effects of rulings between the two tribunals. The Supreme Court 
in 2016 approved the PTO’s application of the broadest reasonable interpreta­
tion standard of claim construction in AIA proceedings, rejecting the argument 
that the agency should apply the ordinary meaning standard applied by the 
courts.207 The Court recognized that the divergent standards facilitate inconsis­
tent rulings, but nevertheless granted the PTO Chevron deference.208 
That deference, however, would also probably permit the PTO to change 
course and apply the same standard of claim construction that applies in court 
proceedings. Indeed, the agency’s justifications for applying the broadest reason­
able interpretation standard in AIA proceedings are questionable. For instance, 
the PTO has asserted that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is 
justified by “a party’s ability to amend claims to avoid prior art.”209 But the 
opportunity to amend is limited in AIA proceedings,210 and the PTAB has 
granted few motions to amend.211 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MOTION TO AMEND STUDY 6 (Apr. 30, 2016), http://www.uspto. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-04-30%20PTAB%20MTA%20study.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YH3Q-5ZD9] (reporting that the PTAB granted, in whole or in part, only six motions to amend in the 
first three-and-a-half years of AIA proceedings, out of 118 decided). The Federal Circuit recently 
overturned the PTAB’s practice of placing on the patentee the burden to show that proposed amend­
ments are patentable over the prior art. See Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (en banc). Though that decision appears to make it easier for patentees to secure amendments, 
other considerations suggest that amendments will remain rare in AIA proceedings. See Naveen Modi et 
al., Aqua Products: Watershed Decision or Barely a Ripple, LAW360 (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:11 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/974695 [https://perma.cc/Z32S-KLNU] (discussing limits on the num­
ber and scope of amendments that the patentee may propose and how the doctrine of intervening rights 
can prevent patentees from recovering past damages if claims have been amended). 
The PTO has also justified the broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard on the ground that it has applied that standard 
in reexamination proceedings “for nearly thirty years.”212 Yet reexamination is 
fundamentally different than AIA proceedings, a point the PTAB itself has 
emphasized in refusing to give preclusive effect to its own reexamination 
decisions in AIA proceedings.213 In reexamination, amendments are liberally 
permitted—indeed, claim amendment is the most common outcome of ex parte 
207. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). 
208. Id. at 2142, 2146. 
209. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and 
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,688 (Aug. 14, 
2012) (citing In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
210. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1) (2012) (allowing the patent owner to file only one motion to 
amend). 
211. 
212. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and 
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,697–98. 
213. See BioDelivery Sci. Int’l, Inc. v. Monosol Rx, LLC, No. IPR2015-00169, 2016 Pat. App. 
LEXIS 13050, at *24 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2016) (“[I]nter partes review under the AIA offers a significant 
procedural opportunity to the parties that was not available in the prior inter partes reexamination 
proceeding.”). 
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reexamination (which survives the enactment of the AIA).214 In short, there are 
good reasons for the PTO to apply the ordinary meaning claim construction 
standard in AIA proceedings. If the PTO applied the ordinary meaning standard, 
there would be more preclusion between the courts and the PTO, and the 
inefficiencies of parallel proceedings would be reduced.215 
Another option to facilitate preclusion between the courts and the PTO would 
be to have both tribunals apply the same burden of proof on the question of 
invalidity. Congress has two basic options on that score. First, it could require 
the PTAB to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard that currently 
applies in court. That standard, however, is a form of judicial deference to 
agency decision making,216 and it makes little sense to say that a three-judge 
panel of the PTAB should defer to a prior decision by a single examiner. The 
other option would be for both the courts and the PTO to apply a preponderance 
of the evidence standard. If, as many believe, the PTO issues too many patents 
that do not actually satisfy the requirements for patentability, then the clear and 
convincing evidence standard improperly insulates many patents from invalidity 
challenges.217 Indeed, the decision to issue a patent, made by a single examiner 
with limited time to allocate to the task, does not seem like the type of reasoned 
decision making to which court deference is typically appropriate.218 
The most radical solution to the problem of parallel proceedings and duplica­
tive litigation would be to adopt a regime of staged adjudication in which the 
PTO first and exclusively resolves all issues of validity and then the courts 
decide infringement and remedies.219 Staged adjudication would offer several 
potential benefits. First, it would provide the public with more decisions on 
214. See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that 66% of claims are 
amended in reexamination). 
215. Alternatively, Rochelle Dreyfuss has suggested that both the courts and the PTO should apply 
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, noting that its objective nature could enhance unifor­
mity and reduce appellate reversal rates. See Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 269–70. Though it is not clear 
that any standard of claim construction can be truly objective given the inherent malleability of the 
language used in patent claims, cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Patent Notice and the Trouble with Plain 
Meaning, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2016) (“[T]here is no such thing as plain meaning that 
everybody concerned will accept, especially when it comes to innovative products and processes where 
there is money at stake.”), the salient point is that the efficiency of proceedings would be enhanced if 
the courts and the PTO applied the same claim construction standard, whatever that standard might be. 
216. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System 
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 281–82, 284 (2007). 
217. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60  
STAN. L. REV. 45, 49–51 (2007) (proposing to limit the presumption of validity to situations in which the 
patentee submitted to a more rigorous initial examination or a court, the ITC, or the PTO has already 
reevaluated validity and found in the patentee’s favor). 
218. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting that the deference courts give 
to an agency decision “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”). 
219. For proposals along these lines, see Michael Goodman, What’s So Special About Patent Law?, 
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797, 846–48 (2016); Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the 
Useful Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 556 (1997). 
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patent validity in the relatively quick, inexpensive, and expert forum of the 
PTO.220 Second, a PTO affirmation of validity, though it would formally bind 
only those accused infringers who were parties to the administrative proceed­
ing,221 would generate useful information that could lead to reduced litigation 
costs. For example, in future disputes, the PTO would likely treat its own prior 
ruling as highly persuasive,222 which would discourage future accused infring­
ers from relitigating validity. Finally, a model of strictly staged adjudication, in 
which validity is fully resolved before infringement is litigated, would avoid the 
problems that arise in other countries where validity and infringement proceed­
ings are bifurcated but simultaneous. In Germany, for instance, it is rare for 
courts to stay litigation pending administrative review of validity.223 
Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent 
Reviews, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601562 
[https://perma.cc/2KBT-NV92] (noting that German courts stay infringement proceedings in light of 
administrative revocation proceedings only 20% of the time). 
Conse­
quently, courts commonly find a patent infringed and issue an injunction only 
for the patent to be invalidated later in separate administrative proceedings.224 
Staged adjudication, however, could have several drawbacks. It could extend 
the overall duration of proceedings, particularly in cases in which the PTO 
affirms the patent’s validity but there are close questions on infringement. 
Indeed, if infringement is easier to decide in a given case, and particularly if the 
ruling would be one of noninfringement and would end the case, it seems 
questionable to require the parties and the PTO to resolve validity first. Also, 
litigants could attempt to argue for different claim constructions in the different 
tribunals. Patentees, for instance, would argue for narrow constructions at the 
PTO to avoid invalidation, and then argue for broad constructions in litigation 
to ensnare the infringer’s product or process.225 Thus, strict rules of estoppel 
and preclusion would be an essential element of an efficient regime of staged 
adjudication. Also, because patent validity could be resolved more quickly and 
cheaply at the PTO, parties would be incentivized to challenge more patents, 
potentially increasing overall litigation costs.226 Lastly, but most fundamentally, 
the Supreme Court is currently considering a case in which it could rule that it is 
220. Cf. John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative 
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 130–31 (2000) (discussing the expertise of the PTO on 
patent claim interpretation as a reason for courts to defer to the PTO’s interpretation of patent claims). 
221. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). 
222. To draw an analogy, when a patent’s validity is confirmed in ex parte reexamination, courts 
typically give that decision some weight in subsequent litigation. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. 
Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
223. 
224. Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis of Germany’s Bifurcated Patent 
Litigation, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218, 219 (2016) (reporting that 12% of awarded injunctions are 
based on patents later proved to be invalid). 
225. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2202–03 
(2016) (highlighting the importance of unified proceedings to determine the scope of IP rights). 
226. See William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 99, 100–01 (1993) (noting that sequential trials increase the plaintiff’s incentive to sue and 
increase the number of lawsuits). 
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unconstitutional for the PTO (as compared to the courts) to invalidate issued 
patents.227 Although the lower federal courts have repeatedly rejected that 
argument,228 a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary would obviously make it 
difficult if not impossible to create a regime in which the PTO has the exclusive 
power to adjudicate patent validity. 
In sum, the administrative proceedings created by the AIA are fast and seem, 
at first blush, to represent a significant savings in litigation-related costs. Indeed, 
the PTO itself has touted the new proceedings as “hav[ing] significantly changed 
the patent landscape by providing a faster, cost-efficient quality check on issued 
patents.”229 
Dennis Crouch, PTAB Procedural Reform Initiative, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 7, 2017) https://patentlyo. 
com/patent/2017/04/procedural-reform-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/EA4M-SSRE] (excerpting a PTO 
press release). 
Yet numerous complexities remain, particularly in the relationship 
between those proceedings and concurrent or subsequent infringement litigation 
in the federal courts. Finding ways to better coordinate court and PTO proceed­
ings is therefore critical to realizing the efficiency gains that the PTO’s quick 
decisions could provide. 
2. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
Although Congress created the new AIA proceedings for the specific purpose 
of expediting resolution of patent disputes, other recent developments in patent 
law achieve the same goal, albeit less explicitly. The foremost example is the 
doctrine that has changed most dramatically in the past decade: patentable 
subject matter. 
Section 101 of the Patent Act permits patents on any new and useful 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”230 Despite that 
broad language, courts have long recognized implicit limits on the types of 
inventions eligible for patenting. In simplest terms, scientific principles, natural 
laws, and abstract ideas are not patent eligible,231 but specific applications of 
those principles, laws, and ideas are.232 After the Supreme Court appeared to 
loosen the requirements of patent eligibility in the early 1980s,233 the Federal 
227. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 639 F. App’x 639 (Fed. Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017). 
228. See, e.g., MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1292–93 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (rejecting a challenge to AIA review based on both Article III and the Seventh Amendment); 
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 605 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to 
ex parte reexamination); see also Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancella­
tion, 23 B.U. J. SCI. &  TECH. L. 377, 380–81 (2017) (arguing that administrative adjudication of patent 
validity is consistent with both Article III and the Seventh Amendment). 
229. 
230. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
231. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (holding that a mathematical 
formula is not patent eligible); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131–32 
(1948) (invalidating a patent on a composition of two naturally occurring bacteria). 
232. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981) (holding a method of molding rubber 
that used a mathematical formula patent eligible); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 
(1980) (holding a manmade bacterium useful for cleaning up oil spills patent eligible). 
233. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10. 
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Circuit and the PTO further eroded the limits on eligibility in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. During that period, the PTO issued many patents on software and 
business methods, which, because of their inherently abstract nature, had poorly 
defined boundaries.234 This led to high rates of litigation235 even though patents 
are not thought to be an important incentive for innovation in those areas.236 
Increased patenting of early-stage biotechnology, such as naturally occurring 
gene fragments, also created worries about an emerging anticommons— 
specifically, that any practical gene therapy would require the simultaneous use 
of numerous different patents.237 
Many of these newly issued patents on software, business methods, and basic 
biotechnology, even if patent eligible under prevailing section 101 doctrine, 
should not, in the view of many observers, have satisfied other requirements of 
patentability, particularly the nonobviousness requirement of section 103. In 
2003, the Federal Trade Commission issued a widely read report arguing that 
the Federal Circuit had made it too difficult to prove obviousness,238 
U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10–12 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote­
innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7KMY-RXGF]. 
as part of a 
broader critique of the court’s doctrine for overvaluing patent rights and under­
valuing market incentives for innovation.239 Similarly, in an influential book 
published in 2008, Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer argued that the Federal Circuit 
had, over the preceding two decades, overseen a proliferation of patents on 
trivial advances in technology, particularly in the field of computer software.240 
Commentators also criticized the Federal Circuit’s obviousness case law in the 
area of biotechnology.241 
During that time, the Federal Circuit had required, as a prerequisite to finding 
obviousness, that courts or patent examiners identify a specific “teaching, 
234. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 187–88, 192–93. For a challenge to the conventional 
wisdom that the Federal Circuit facilitated the increase in business method patents, see John F. Duffy, 
Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1251–52 (2011), which argues that the growth 
of those patents was driven by the introduction of mathematical and scientific techniques into the fields 
of economics and business. 
235. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 152–53; see also Michael J. Meurer, Controlling 
Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 542 (2003) 
(noting that business method patents present a high risk of “opportunistic lawsuits” because indepen­
dent invention is likely and surveillance of research activity by other potential inventors is difficult). 
236. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275 (2000). 
237. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 
86–89 (2009). 
238. 
239. See Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1493–95 (2015) (describing the 
tension between the Commission and the Federal Circuit on matters of innovation policy). 
240. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 212–13. 
241. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1179 (2002); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing 
New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999). 
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suggestion, or motivation” to combine prior art references.242 That can be a 
difficult task, particularly with software and business methods, where key 
references are often hidden as source code in a commercial product or consist of 
common knowledge of a general business practice.243 In 2007, the Supreme 
Court, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., deemphasized the “teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation” test, instead ruling that the obviousness analysis 
should be “expansive and flexible.”244 Specifically, the Court indicated that a 
finding of obviousness can be based on market demands, design incentives, or 
even the common sense of a person having ordinary skill in the art.245 
By making it easier to prove obviousness, the flexible framework articulated 
in KSR helped ameliorate some of the problems created by the generous 
standards of patentability embraced by the Federal Circuit and the PTO.246 As 
discussed above, however, obviousness is a poor vehicle for quickly invalidating 
a patent because it depends on underlying questions of fact.247 Although the 
Court in KSR endorsed resolving obviousness on summary judgment,248 summary 
judgment typically occurs after the parties have incurred a substantial portion of 
discovery-related expenses, if not all of them. And because obviousness is based on 
facts, summary judgment is the earliest stage at which the issue can be resolved. 
The same goes for other key grounds of invalidity, such as anticipation and 
lack of enablement.249 Also, in 2005, the Federal Circuit held that short gene 
fragments with no currently known function do not satisfy the Patent Act’s 
utility requirement.250 But the Federal Circuit has held that utility is a question 
of fact,251 so it, too, cannot be resolved before summary judgment. 
Courts treat patent eligibility, by contrast, as a question of law that usually 
does not implicate any disputes of fact, meaning that it can be used to invalidate 
patents before discovery begins, on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the 
pleadings.252 Thus, the invigorated patent eligibility requirement is, like Con­
gress’s expansion of post-issuance proceedings at the PTO, another route to 
quick decisions on patent validity.253 
242. E.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
243. See Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. TELE­
COMM. &  TECH. L. REV. 253, 279–80 (2001); Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien, Encouraging 
Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255, 301–02 (1997). 
244. 550 U.S. 398, 415, 419 (2007). 
245. Id. at 418. 
246. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After All: Patent Law’s 
Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41, 43 (2012). 
247. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
248. KSR, 550 U.S. at 426–27. 
249. See supra notes 135–37. 
250. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
251. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1252 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
252. See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
253. To be clear, the Supreme Court has never held that patent eligibility is devoid of factual considerations. 
Indeed, the Court has sometimes based its eligibility analysis on “undisputed” propositions that look like facts. 
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To briefly summarize the recent developments in eligibility doctrine (which 
have been discussed in detail elsewhere254): In 2010, shortly after the Federal 
Circuit began to retreat from prior decisions embracing broad patent eligibility 
for business methods,255 the Supreme Court invalidated a patent on a method of 
hedging financial risk because it claimed “an unpatentable abstract idea.”256 
Two years later, the Court invalidated as directed to a law of nature a patent on a 
method of administering a drug to a patient and then determining its metabolite 
levels in the body.257 The Court emphasized that, beyond reciting the natural 
correlation between metabolite levels and drug safety and efficacy, the patent merely 
recited “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” that doctors already engaged 
in.258 The next year, the Court invalidated patents on isolated sequences of DNA 
because they occur in nature.259 Most recently, the Court struck down patents on 
computer software that used an intermediary to ensure parties performed a contract.260 
The Court reasoned that the idea of using intermediaries already existed in the analog 
world and that the patent contained no “inventive concept” to transform that abstract 
idea into a “patent-eligible application” of the idea.261 
On the surface, the Court’s decisions reflect concern about the substance of 
patent law: specifically, that the Federal Circuit and the PTO have too readily 
permitted patents on basic concepts that are important to follow-on innovation— 
what the Court has called “building blocks of human ingenuity.”262 The Court’s 
opinions have made passing reference, at most, to the aim of reducing litigation-
related costs,263 and have not discussed speed to decision at all. Yet the 
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013). The Court has also 
made the seemingly factual question of whether activity covered by the patent is “conventional” an important 
criterion in determining eligibility. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
79–80 (2012). Thus, though lower courts often treat eligibility as lacking factual considerations, their approach 
may not be correct as a matter of doctrine or as a matter of policy. See infra text accompanying notes 309–12 
(suggesting that eligibility could be treated as a question of law based on factual inquiries). 
254. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience 
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. &  TECH. L. 349, 356–58 (2015); Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural 
Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1151–52 (2014). 
255. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming the PTO’s rejection of 
a patent application claiming a method of requiring and conducting arbitration). 
256. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010). The Federal Circuit in Bilski had actually found the 
invention to be ineligible for patenting, too. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
257. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79–80. 
258. Id. 
259. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
260. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352, 2357 (2014). 
261. Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72). 
262. E.g., id. at 2354 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89). 
263. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 656 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for a 
blanket prohibition on business method patents, noting that “[e]ven if a business method patent is ultimately 
held invalid, patent holders may be able to use it to threaten litigation and to bully competitors, especially those 
that cannot bear the costs of a drawn-out, fact-intensive patent litigation”); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. 
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) (noting 
patents can sometimes “discourage research” by, among other things, “leading [researchers] to conduct costly 
and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents” and “requiring complex licensing arrangements”). 
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invigoration of the eligibility requirement can help courts resolve infringement dis­
putes more quickly and cheaply by allowing validity to be resolved on the pleadings 
as a matter of law. As Figure 1 below shows, the number of pleadings-stage dismiss­
als on eligibility grounds has dramatically increased since the beginning of the 
Supreme Court’s recent string of decisions. 
Figure 1. Pleadings-Stage Eligibility Dismissals 
Although district courts sometimes grant 
motions to dismiss without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff will have an opportu­
nity to file an amended complaint, my review of the specific eligibility dismissals 
captured on Figure 1 below suggests that most of those dismissals are with prejudice— 
they are, in other words, the final word on patent validity as far as the district court is 
concerned.264 Because the dismissal is for the legal insufficiency of the complaint, not 
its factual insufficiency, filing an amended complaint would do the patentee no good.265 
The data used to create Figure 1 cover all federal district courts nationwide and are drawn from 
Docket Navigator’s motion success tool. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, http://home.docketnavigator.com. 
264. See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 107 F. Supp. 3d 639, 655 
(N.D. Tex. 2015) (granting motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds without offering the plaintiff an 
opportunity to amend the complaint), vacated and remanded, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
265. 
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I obtained the data by running the following search: (1) Type of court document: motion to dismiss— 
failure to state a claim OR motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) Order filed date: January 1, 2010, 
to December 31, 2016, inclusive; (3) Legal issue: Unpatentable subject matter (35 U.S.C. § 101) and 
selected subcategories, including patent ineligible subject matter (and all of its subcategories), inventive 
concept, and preemption. Though more elaborate empirical work could certainly be done with regard to 
district courts’ practices on eligibility, I offer this chart mainly to confirm what patent lawyers and 
scholars intuitively know: pleading-stage eligibility dismissals, which were nearly unheard of less than 
a decade ago, are now a common occurrence in patent litigation. For further confirmation of this trend, 
see Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 
Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 23 tbl. 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050093 [https://perma.cc/K6A5-QDHA] (report­
ing that, from June 2012 to February 2017, 69.4% of district court decisions on eligibility (249 of 359) 
were made on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and that 63.1% of those 
pleadings-stage decisions (157 of 249) invalidated the patent). 
Many observers have viewed the Supreme Court’s invigoration of the eligibil­
ity requirement as problematic because, in their view, the requirement, which 
demands that patents contain an “inventive concept,” has no policy justification 
that is independent from the other requirements of patentability.266 As the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged, there will sometimes be “overlap” in analyz­
ing whether a claim contains an inventive concept and whether it satisfies the 
novelty and nonobviousness requirements.267 In addition, the Court’s concern 
about the availability of “building blocks” can be read as condemning claims 
that are overly broad268—highly similar to the animating policy of section 112’s 
enablement requirement, which requires the patent to disclose sufficiently de­
tailed information to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to recreate the 
invention without undue experimentation.269 The bar on patenting abstract ideas 
also looks similar to the specific utility requirement, which ensures that a patent 
“is not so vague as to be meaningless,”270 section 112’s definiteness require­
ment, which ensures that the public has reasonably certain notice of the patent’s 
boundaries,271 and the written description doctrine, which ensures that the 
patentee has described the invention with particularity.272 
266. See J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 267, 281 (2015) (summarizing commentary). 
267. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. 
268. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter 
for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 56–59 (2012). 
269. Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co, 159 U.S. 465, 475 (1895). 
270. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The specific utility requirement can be 
contrasted with the practical utility requirement, which ensures “that an invention is useful to the 
public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further 
research.” Id. The utility requirements, like the eligibility requirement, stem from section 101 of the 
Patent Act, which permits patents on “new and useful” processes, machines, and so on. 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
271. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014); see also 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112(b) (requiring the patent to contain “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
claiming” the invention). 
272. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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None of those requirements, however, are susceptible to quick resolution 
because they all turn on questions of fact.273 Issues of fact can of course be 
resolved on summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute between the 
parties.274 But summary judgment in discovery-intensive patent cases is much 
more expensive than a motion to dismiss. Thus, one arguably coherent policy 
justification for the eligibility requirement is that, as a “coarse-grained filter” for 
patentability,275 it provides a means for quickly and cheaply wiping out patents 
that are so likely to be invalidated under other requirements of patentability that 
discovery is not warranted.276 
The litigation cost savings that flow from early resolution of validity via the 
eligibility requirement may, however, come at the price of decreased accu­
racy.277 
For an argument questioning whether judges are capable of making “cheap and accurate” 
assessments of eligibility on the limited record that is usually available early in the case, see Andres 
Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2968650 [https://perma.cc/8RL9-6LKS]. 
Specifically, courts may be using the eligibility requirement to invali­
date meritorious inventions. The Federal Circuit’s 2015 decision in Ariosa 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.278 is widely considered to be the paradig­
matic example.279 In Ariosa, the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent on methods 
of detecting fetal DNA that floats freely in the mother’s body.280 The discovery 
273. See supra notes 132–41 and accompanying text; see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating that written description is a question of fact). 
Given that the written description requirement hinges on documentary evidence, namely, a comparison 
of the inventor’s original disclosure to the issued claims, one might reasonably question whether that 
requirement truly presents a factual issue. See Jesse S. Keene, Fact or Fiction: Reexamining the Written 
Description Doctrine’s Classification as a Question of Fact, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 25, 59–60 (2009). 
274. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
275. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 
1058 (2011); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter are no more than a ‘coarse eligibility filter.’ In other 
words, . . . the  expansive categories—process, machine, article of manufacture, and composition of 
matter—are not substitutes for the substantive patentability requirements set forth in §§ 102, 103, and 
112 and invoked expressly by § 101 itself.” (citing Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 
F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010))), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. 
Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014). 
276. In contrast to this justification grounded in considerations of timing and litigation-related costs, 
other scholars have attempted to justify eligibility’s redundancy of other patentability requirements on 
substantive grounds. John Golden, for example, has argued that redundancy can prevent patent drafters 
from exploiting gaps left by other, compartmentalized doctrines of patentability. John M. Golden, 
Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 710–11 (2016). Similarly, Kevin Collins 
has argued that eligibility can limit the scope of patent protection in technologies where other validity 
doctrines impose minimal restrictions. Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent-Ineligibility as Counteraction, 
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 955, 1002, 1019 (2017) (providing the example of medical diagnostics, which, in 
his view, inherently involve newly created knowledge that satisfies the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements). 
277. 
278. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
279. See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The Uneasy 
Case” of Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1739, 1770–71 
(2016). 
280. 788 F.3d at 1373. 
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of this cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) was an important breakthrough. Previously, fetal 
genetic testing could be conducted only by extracting a sample directly from the 
fetus—an expensive and risky procedure.281 Yet the Federal Circuit invalidated 
Sequenom’s patent because cffDNA occurs naturally and the techniques for detecting 
and amplifying it were well known at the time of the invention.282 
Related to concerns about the invalidation of meritorious inventions is the 
claim that the Supreme Court’s test for eligibility, which turns on the existence 
of “abstract ideas,” “natural laws,” and “inventive concepts,” is so amorphous 
that lower courts’ application of the doctrine is confused and unpredictable.283 
One district judge deciding a patent eligibility issue invoked Justice Stewart’s 
famous aphorism for identifying obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”284 
It is certainly plausible that overzealous invalidations are deterring innovation 
in areas such as medical diagnostics.285 And I have no doubt that any decent 
patent lawyer (or law professor) can look at any two eligibility decisions and 
argue that they are inconsistent. For instance, in Rapid Litigation Management 
Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., a case decided mere days after the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in Ariosa, the Federal Circuit upheld the eligibility of a patent 
on a method of preserving hepatocytes (a type of liver cell).286 The court 
distinguished Ariosa on the ground that the patent in Ariosa claimed a method 
of “identifying” cffDNA, which, in the court’s view, amounted to “merely 
claiming the natural phenomen[on] itself.”287 Yet the patent in CellzDirect 
turned on the discovery that hepatocytes could survive multiple freeze-thaw 
cycles—a natural trait of the cells.288 Thus, one could argue that the patent in 
CellzDirect, just like the patent in Ariosa, simply claimed a natural phenom­
enon. The court in CellzDirect, however, pointed out that the patent claimed a 
new, physical method of preservation, not merely observation.289 
Although these critiques of eligibility doctrine have merit, concerns about 
poor-quality patents—and about how patentees use them—have merit, too. 
Before the Supreme Court strengthened the eligibility requirement, there was 
281. Rachel Rebouche´, Testing Sex, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 527 (2015). 
282. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376–77. It should be noted that Ariosa was resolved on summary 
judgment, not the pleadings. But the complaint in that case was filed in 2011—before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mayo, which suggested that many medical diagnostics were not patent eligible. 
Complaint at 6, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 
3:11-cv-6391). Perhaps for that reason, Ariosa’s original declaratory judgment complaint sought only a 
ruling of noninfringement, not invalidity. See id. 
283. See Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard 
of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1798–1801 (2014); David O. Taylor, Confusing 
Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 158–61 (2016). 
284. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14-154, 2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
285. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. &  TECH. L. 256, 256–57 
(2015). 
286. 827 F.3d 1042, 1044, 1050–51 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
287. Id. at 1048. 
288. Id. at 1045, 1048. 
289. Id. at 1048, 1050–52. 
2018] QUICK DECISIONS IN PATENT CASES 657 
effectively no way for accused infringers to seek dismissal on the merits before 
discovery began. Thus, eligibility doctrine, though it may not be substantively 
perfect, fills an important procedural gap by providing a mechanism to quickly 
and cheaply invalidate patents that are clearly invalid.290 Rather than abolishing 
the eligibility requirement, as some have suggested,291 or requiring courts to 
avoid deciding eligibility issues until they have resolved all other grounds of 
patentability, as others have proposed,292 we might consider ways to increase 
the accuracy of eligibility rulings while preserving courts’ discretion to invoke 
this cost-saving mechanism in appropriate cases. 
One potential infirmity with current eligibility law is its form. It is very much 
a fuzzy standard, not a clear rule. Standards can be more costly to enforce than 
rules and less predictable in application.293 This uncertainty may be exacerbated 
in patent law, where the ambiguous standard of eligibility has been piled atop 
the amorphous standard of nonobviousness—a multi-faceted, case-specific in­
quiry into the prior art, differences between that prior art and the invention, the 
level of ordinary skill in the art, and other considerations about market demand, 
commercial success, failure of others, and “common sense.”294 If the law of 
eligibility were made more rule-like, patentability would be resolved through a 
series of successive tests that are each more fact-intensive than the one before it. 
Clear, categorical exclusions from patent eligibility could be resolved on the 
pleadings or a very early summary judgment motion. More fact-driven validity 
doctrines, such as nonobviousness and the disclosure doctrines, could then 
290. Invoking terminology used by Bob Bone, one might view this approach to eligibility as a 
“thick” screening model, in which pleading-stage dismissals target not just objectively frivolous suits 
(as a “thin” screening model would, see infra note 349), but also suits that are very weak. See Robert G. 
Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 849, 870 (2010). Bone is ultimately skeptical of thick screening, arguing that a better way to 
balance the costs and benefits of early dismissal would be to engage in thin screening at the pleading 
stage followed by limited discovery before more aggressive screening of the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim. Id. at 881. In a similar vein, I suggest below that courts might reconceive patent eligibility as a 
question of law based on narrowly defined factual inquiries to reduce the risk that meritorious claims 
will be erroneously dismissed on a limited factual record. See infra note 311 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra note 19. 
292. See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts 
should avoid reaching for interpretations of broad provisions, such as § 101, when more specific 
statutes, such as §§ 102, 103, and 112, can decide the case.”); Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, 
Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1673, 1678 (2010). But see, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“[S]ection 101 imposes a threshold test, one that must be 
satisfied before a court can proceed to consider subordinate validity issues such as non-obvious­
ness . . . or  adequate written description . . . .”  (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
293. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 144, at 577, 596 (noting that rules are not always simpler to apply than 
standards). With regard to patent eligibility, the difficulty with a standard-like test may be particularly 
acute in the examination process. See Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551, 592 
(2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court identifies an ‘abstract idea’ largely by analogizing (and distinguishing) 
prior precedent. This is feasible for judges, who are trained and experienced at common law reasoning, 
but . . .  both foreign to, and difficult for, nonlawyer patent examiners.” (footnotes omitted)). 
294. See Golden, supra note 276, at 701–02. 
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remain in their current, standard-like forms and be resolved on summary 
judgment at the close of discovery or at trial.295 
But the value of doctrinal clarity in facilitating quick and accurate decisions 
on eligibility does not mean that legislative intervention is warranted.296 It is not 
unusual for common law doctrines, which patent eligibility effectively is, to 
crystalize into rules over time.297 Recent decisions by the Federal Circuit 
provide at least some reason to think that the law of eligibility could, over time, 
assume a more a rule-like form that is more predictable in application. For 
instance, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bilski v. Kappos and 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the Federal Circuit has issued several 
opinions upholding software-related patents against eligibility challenges. The 
Federal Circuit’s case law confirms what the Supreme Court suggested in Alice: 
traditional business techniques implemented on a generic computer are not 
eligible for patenting.298 But software-related inventions are patent eligible if 
they improve the function of a computer,299 solve a problem unique to the 
Internet,300 or implement an arguably abstract idea in a very specific way.301 
295. For a similar proposal to reform trademark fair use doctrine, see McGeveran, Trademark Fair 
Use Reform, supra note 46, at 2299 (“Under the proposal, trademark cases that raise free speech issues 
would move through a sequence of successively more complicated tests . . . .  Each test . . .  imposes 
greater administrative costs to adjudicate. Each one moves further along the spectrum from rules to 
standards. . . .  [T]he first and simplest [test] is a categorical exclusion . . . .  Expressive uses [of a 
trademark] that meet the conditions of an exclusion are exempt from liability, without any further 
inquiry into the likelihood of consumer confusion. Cases that fall outside these defined categories 
would remain eligible for the existing trademark fair use doctrines and presumably for standards-based 
reforms that other scholars have suggested. Finally, courts would evaluate the remaining cases . . . un­
der the likelihood of confusion test.”). 
296. Cf. David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2151–52 (2017) 
(arguing that Congress should amend section 101). 
297. See McGeveran, Trademark Fair Use Reform, supra note 46, at 2288; see also Keith N. 
Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1117, 1148 
(2016) (noting that the “inherent uncertainty” stemming from the Supreme Court’s recent eligibility 
decisions “does not need to be a focus of [law] reform, because the common law process is necessarily 
uncertain at an early stage of analysis of a particular class of legal claims”). 
298. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(invalidating a patent describing “the automation of the fundamental economic concept of offer-based 
price optimization through the use of generic-computer functions”); see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (observing that the patents in suit did “not . . .  purport to improve 
the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or technical 
field”). 
299. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(upholding the eligibility of a patent on a “self-referential table for a computer database,” noting it is “a 
specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in 
memory”). 
300. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(upholding the eligibility of a patent on an invention that addressed the problem of retaining website 
visitors upon the click of an advertising link, noting that “the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in 
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer 
networks”). 
301. See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350–52 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (upholding the eligibility of a patent on filtering Internet content where the patent 
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Although not every Federal Circuit eligibility decision is amenable to easy 
characterization,302 much of the court’s case law can be understood to embrace 
a “technological arts” test, under which “advances in non-technological 
disciplines, such as business, law, or the social sciences,” are not patent 
eligible.303 
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“A 
rule holding that claims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an entrepreneurial objective, 
such as methods for increasing revenue, minimizing economic risk, or structuring commercial transac­
tions, rather than a technological one, would comport with the guidance provided in both Alice and 
Bilski.”); see Joshua L. Sohn, A Defense of the Current Jurisprudence on Section 101, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 
2016, 9:53 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/846930/a-defense-of-the-current-jurisprudence-on­
section-101 [https://perma.cc/U57P-5MSX] (“[T]he Federal Circuit has consistently invalidated patent 
claims that simply apply economic, business, or human-interaction practices on a computer without 
improving the computer itself or any other technological art.”). 
On the other hand, patents covering technological improvements in 
computer hardware or software—particularly those that improve the functioning 
of the computer or that solve a problem unique to the realm of computers or the 
Internet—are patent eligible.304 
See Matt Levy, Software Patents Will Survive: How Section 101 Law Is Settling Down, 
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/11/30/software-patents-will-survive/id= 
75101 [https://perma.cc/T7HC-9ZQL] (noting that a claim is patent eligible under recent Federal 
Circuit case law if it is “a technical improvement to a technical problem”). 
Likewise, in the realm of biotechnology, one 
could plausibly reconcile the decisions in Ariosa and CellzDirect by noting that 
inventions are not patent eligible if they cover the mere isolation or detection of 
a naturally occurring chemical but that they are patent eligible if they entail the 
making of a new thing or the creation of a new, physical process.305 
required the filter to be located on a remote server and required the filter to allow customization by 
users); see also McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (finding not to be an abstract idea claims on a process for synchronizing animation with sound, 
noting that the process “uses a combined order of specific rules that renders information into a specific 
format”). 
302. For instance, the court recently held patent eligible some rather vague claims to a computer 
program for processing network usage information, relying heavily on the specification to find 
non-generic aspects of the invention. See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 
1299–1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This reliance on the specification prompted a vigorous dissent from Judge 
Reyna, who asserted that the majority’s holding “contravenes the fundamental [principle] that the 
section 101 inquiry is about whether the claims are directed to a patent-eligible invention, not whether 
the specification is so directed.” Id. at 1307 (Reyna, J., dissenting). An intracircuit split appears to be 
percolating on the relevance of the specification—if any—to the eligibility analysis. See Two-Way 
Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The main 
problem that [the patentee] cannot overcome is that the claim—as opposed to something purportedly 
described in the specification—is missing an inventive concept.”). 
303. 
304. 
305. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 
71 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 14–15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015459 [https:// 
perma.cc/6FB6-37C9]. 
Another potential critique of current eligibility law, despite the doctrine’s 
ability to facilitate quick decisions on patent validity, is that the Supreme 
Court’s run of opinions consistently ruling against the patentee has incentivized 
too many pleading-stage eligibility motions. If many of those motions lack 
merit, the invigorated eligibility requirement could, as a systemic matter, be 
creating more litigation without providing earlier or cheaper resolution. As 
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discussed above, the number of pleading-stage dismissals on eligibility grounds 
has increased in recent years. But, as Figure 2 below illustrates, the percentage 
of motions that have been granted (in whole or in part) has begun to fall.306 
Figure 2. Pleading-Stage Eligibility Motion Grant Rates 
The falling grant rate could be interpreted to suggest that weaker motions are 
now being filed. A few words of caution, however. First, the population size is 
small. In 2016, district courts decided 149 pleading-stage eligibility motions, up 
from 101 in 2015, 24 in 2014, and 11 in 2013. Similarly, the timeframe is 
limited, meaning that any claims about trends should be made carefully. Finally, 
although the grant rate appears to be falling, in 2016 it was about 50%, which 
would be consistent with litigants adjusting to the new test for eligibility and 
decisions coalescing around the 50% win-rate predicted by the Priest–Klein 
hypothesis.307 
In any event, the process of resolving patent eligibility could be improved in 
various ways that would enhance accuracy without eliminating the cost savings 
306. I obtained this data by running the same search described above in Docket Navigator’s motion 
success tool. See supra note 265. 
307. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 5 (1984). The validity of that hypothesis has, of course, been questioned and critiqued. See, e.g., 
Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 187, 188 (1993) (citing literature and presenting an extension of the Priest–Klein hypothesis that 
incorporates considerations about the information available to the parties and its legal relevance). 
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quick decisions can provide.308 Most fundamentally, courts should carefully 
consider whether the eligibility inquiry truly presents a question of law that can 
be resolved on the pleadings. The test for eligibility developed by the Supreme 
Court suggests that factfinding can at least sometimes be necessary. In Alice and 
Bilski, for example, the Court ruled that the patents claimed abstract ideas 
because they involved the “fundamental economic practice[s]” of intermediated 
settlement and risk hedging, respectively.309 And in Mayo the Court invalidated 
patents on medical diagnostic tests because they claimed “well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific commu­
nity.”310 Determining the prevailing practices of a particular community would 
seem to be a factual inquiry, not a legal one. 
Thus, a more coherent way forward would be for the Federal Circuit to 
explicitly recognize the factual underpinnings of the eligibility analysis rather 
than simply reciting that “[p]atent eligibility under [section] 101 is an issue of 
law,” as the court has often done.311 In fact, some Federal Circuit case law 
predating the recent resurgence of the eligibility requirement acknowledges the 
factual components of the analysis.312 And, as this Article was going to press, 
the Federal Circuit issued an opinion declaring rather emphatically that the 
question under Mayo of whether claim elements are “conventional” is, indeed, a 
question of fact.313 
Under an approach treating eligibility as a question of law based on underly­
ing questions of fact, dismissal on the pleadings would remain appropriate 
when—as is not uncommon—the patent itself recites the prevailing practices 
that provide the basis for the invalidity ruling314 or the relevant practices are a 
308. I explore these possibilities in more detail in a forthcoming article, Paul R. Gugliuzza, The 
Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
309. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 
611 (2010). 
310. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–80 (2012). 
311. E.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
312. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (stating that the eligibility analysis “may require findings of underlying facts specific to the 
particular subject matter and its mode of claiming”); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 
1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he analysis under § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is rife 
with underlying factual issues.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. 
Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014). 
313. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Aatrix Software, Inc. v. 
Green Shades Software, Inc., No. 2017-1452, 2018 WL 843288, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2018) 
(holding that factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint about the patent’s inventiveness required 
the district court to deny a motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds). 
314. In Mayo, for instance, the Court drew heavily from the patent’s specification (the detailed 
description of the invention that precedes the patent’s claims) to support its conclusion that the patent 
did not contain the required inventive concept. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–80. Note, however, that Mayo 
was resolved on summary judgment, not the pleadings. Id. at 76. For an example of a Federal Circuit 
opinion relying mainly on the specification to affirm a pleading-stage ruling of invalidity, see Intellec­
tual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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matter of common knowledge.315 But explicitly acknowledging the factual 
components of the eligibility analysis would nudge courts to more carefully 
apply the Twombly and Iqbal framework. Rather than simply issuing a yes-or-no 
decision on the patent’s validity, as sometimes seems to be the case,316 dismissal 
would be appropriate only if, viewing the relevant facts in the light most 
favorable to the patentee, there is no plausible case that the patent satisfies the 
eligibility requirement. Where there is a plausible case for eligibility, the parties 
would be allowed to develop and present to the court, perhaps via an early 
summary judgment motion, evidence that would allow a more accurate compari­
son of the patent’s claims to the prior art. 
A more thorough application of Twombly and Iqbal would also ensure that 
courts recognize the role of claim construction in the eligibility analysis. After 
all, the first step of the Alice test is determining whether the patent is “directed 
to” an ineligible concept, such as a law of nature.317 Under Twombly and Iqbal, 
dismissal on the pleadings would be appropriate only if—again viewing any 
relevant facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—there is no plausible 
claim construction under which the patent would satisfy the eligibility test.318 In 
addition, because eligibility is today widely considered to be a pure question of 
law, district courts are deeply split on whether the presumption of validity 
applies.319 Explicitly acknowledging the factual components of the eligibility 
inquiry, as the Federal Circuit has at least begun to do,320 would make clear 
that, for better or worse, the evidentiary presumption applies, just as it does to 
the factual aspects of other validity requirements.321 
315. See, e.g., Network Apparel Grp., LP v. Airwave Networks Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 467, 479–80 (W.D. 
Tex. 2015) (finding the “practice of incentivizing an end user to acknowledge receipt of a message” to be “a 
longstanding commercial practice” and noting that, “[i]n determining whether the purpose of a patent is 
abstract, it is within the Court’s province to consider both the patent specification and well-known, general 
historical observations”), aff’d, 680 F. App’x 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes 
Commc’ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 978 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Eligibility questions mostly involve general 
historical observations, the sort of findings routinely made by courts deciding legal questions.”). 
316. See, e.g., Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 109 F. Supp. 3d 916, 942 (W.D. Tex. 
2015) (“[T]he Court finds as a matter of law that Claim 1 . . .  does not contain an inventive concept in 
that it does not add something to the abstract idea that is an ‘integral’ or ‘significant part’ of the 
invention.”), aff’d, 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
317. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
318. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of Patentability, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 
101–02 (2017) (suggesting that one way to increase accuracy in patent eligibility determinations 
without unduly increasing process costs would be to require the patent owner to submit a proposed 
claim construction “and to take that construction as true for purposes of the subject-matter eligibility 
evaluation”). As I explain in a forthcoming paper, because the Federal Circuit usually treats claim 
construction as a question of law, applying the plausibly standard to matters of claim construction could 
require some adjustments to the law of claim construction itself, including a greater recognition that 
fact questions are central to determining claim meaning. See Gugliuzza, supra note 308. 
319. See Front Row Techs., LLC v. NBA Media Ventures, LLC, 204 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1231–35 
(D.N.M. 2016) (collecting conflicting authorities), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 701 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
320. See supra note 313. 
321. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 114–15 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(describing how the presumption of validity applies to legal questions based on factual inquiries). As 
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Regardless of eligibility doctrine’s potential to facilitate quick decisions, 
skeptics may still view the Supreme Court’s recent decisions as misguided, 
incoherent, and threatening incentives for innovation. Others might point out 
that the new administrative proceedings created by the AIA largely address 
concerns about the weak patents targeted by eligibility doctrine.322 I cannot 
hope to respond to all possible critiques in this space. Rather, my aim has been 
to contribute to the debate over patent eligibility by highlighting an important 
but underappreciated benefit of the doctrine: unlike any other requirement of 
patentability, eligibility provides a mechanism to dismiss low-merit suits before 
the parties incur significant litigation costs. 
3. Pleading Standards 
A final recent change in the law that has the potential to facilitate prediscovery 
decisions in patent cases occurred when the Supreme Court deleted the form com­
plaint for patent infringement from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the 
Federal Circuit had explained, that form, Form 18, required a complaint for direct 
infringement to contain merely an allegation of jurisdiction, a demand for relief, and 
statements that the plaintiff owned the patent, the defendant had been infringing the 
patent, and the plaintiff had given the defendant notice of its infringement.323 The 
Federal Circuit also held that, because pleading direct infringement was specifically 
governed by Form 18, Twombly and Iqbal did not apply.324 Thus, a patentee could 
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim without providing anything more than a 
generic description of the allegedly infringing product or process.325 For that reason, 
the administrative body charged with updating the rules singled out Form 18 as 
particularly “inadequate” for modern litigation.326 
When the Supreme Court deleted Form 18 from the Federal Rules, it also 
deleted Rule 84, which stated that use of an appropriate form satisfied the 
discussed above, there is a reasonable argument that the presumption of validity is unjustified as a 
policy matter because of the limited scrutiny many patents receive during examination. See supra notes 
217–18 and accompanying text. As also discussed, however, any move to eliminate that presumption 
must come from Congress. i4i, 564 U.S. at 113–14 (majority opinion) (reaffirming that the presumption 
requires a patent challenger to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, noting that “[a]ny 
recalibration of the standard of proof [in patent cases] remains in [Congress’s] hands”). 
322. See 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 302 (2017). 
323. In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). There was no form complaint for claims of indirect (that is, induced or contributory) infringement, so 
the amendments to the Federal Rules do not change the pleading standards in those cases. See id. at 1336–37. 
324. Id. at 1334 (“[T]o the extent the parties argue that Twombly and its progeny conflict with the 
Forms and create differing pleadings requirements, the Forms control.”). 
325. See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also K–Tech. 
Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“We do not read 
Form 18 . . . to  require that a plaintiff identify an accused device by name.”). Form 18’s model 
allegation of infringement stated in relevant part: “[T]he defendant has infringed and is still infringing 
the Letters Patent by making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented inven­
tion . . . .”  Id. at 1285 (emphasis added). 
326. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (2013). 
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requirements of the rules.327 Consequently, complaints for direct patent infringe­
ment are now governed by the plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and 
Iqbal.328 As applied to patent cases, that standard requires patent owners to include in 
their complaint factual allegations that would allow a court to make a plausible 
inference of infringement. Much as the invigorated eligibility requirement allows 
courts to dismiss on the pleadings cases in which the patent is clearly invalid, this new 
pleading standard allows courts to dismiss cases in which the defendant clearly does 
not infringe. For example, in a recent case involving a patent that recited a “TV 
Channel,” a magistrate judge recommended dismissal, with prejudice, because the 
accused technology was Internet-based and there was “no plausible basis for alleging 
that the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘TV Channel’ (or ‘TV Channel’ properly 
construed) covers URLs, i.e., a unique address for a web page that makes content 
addressable on the Internet.”329 
Although the deletion of Form 18 facilitates quick decisions when the 
allegations of infringement are plainly insufficient, in closer cases it has caused 
district courts to adopt widely varying pleading requirements.330 In contrast to 
Form 18, many courts now require the complaint to contain allegations linking 
the patent’s claims to the infringing features of the accused product or pro­
cess.331 Under that view, merely identifying the patent and generally describing 
the accused product or process is insufficient.332 But courts have not been 
consistent about the level of detail required. Some have required “factual 
allegations that . . .  permit [the] court to infer that the accused product infringes 
each element of at least one claim.”333 Other courts have been more demanding, 
requiring information about how the defendant infringes each asserted claim.334 
At the other extreme, some courts, despite the deletion of Form 18, have 
continued to absolve plaintiffs from identifying the claims of the patent they are 
327. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 
15, at 28. 
328. The Federal Circuit has not yet articulated what, exactly, the differences between Form 18 and 
the Twombly/Iqbal standard might be, see Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2017), though there are many district court decisions on the issue, as discussed in this portion 
of the Article. Somewhat remarkably, the Federal Circuit has left open the possibility that there is no 
difference at all. See id. (“The parties assume that there is a difference between the requirements of 
Form 18 and Iqbal/Twombly; however, we have never recognized such a distinction.”). 
329. Bartonfalls LLC v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-1127, 2017 WL 1375205, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 15, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1319656 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2017). 
330. See Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-cv-1067, 2017 WL 1197096, at 
*3–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (noting the split of authority); e.Digital Corp. v. iBaby Labs, Inc., No. 
15-cv-0579, 2016 WL 4427209, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (same). 
331. See, e.g., Atlas IP LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 15-cv-5469, 2016 WL 1719545, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016). 
332. See, e.g., Global Tech LED, LLC v. Every Watt Matters, LLC, No. 15-cv-61933, 2016 WL 
6682015, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2016). 
333. E.g., Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp., 189 F. Supp. 3d 768, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d sub nom. 
Atlas IP, LLC v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
334. E.g., Asghari–Kamrani v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 2:15CV478, 2016 WL 1253533, at *4 
(E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2016). 
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asserting.335 Many judges have emphasized that early deadlines in local proce­
dural rules for disclosing infringement contentions mitigate any prejudice to a 
defendant faced with a vague complaint for infringement.336 And one court has 
held that compliance with Form 18 remains sufficient in part because of an 
advisory committee note stating that the abrogation of Rule 84 and the deletion 
of the forms “does not alter existing pleading standards.”337 
Thus, although the deletion of Form 18 would appear to facilitate quick 
decisions of noninfringement, it may actually have encouraged additional litiga­
tion over the substance of the pleading standard and whether the plaintiff in a 
particular case has satisfied it.338 Even in the courts that have imposed a more 
onerous standard, most dismissals have been without prejudice, meaning that 
the patentee has been given the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Cases 
dismissing infringement complaints with prejudice remain the exception, not 
the rule.339 When with-prejudice dismissals do occur, the plaintiff has typically 
had one or more chances to amend the complaint340 or has waived the opportu­
nity to amend.341 
335. E.g., Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 15-cv-8814, 2016 WL 1070853, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 16, 2016). 
336. E.g., Solocron Educ., LLC v. Healthstream, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-16, 2016 WL 9137458, at *3 (E.D. Tex. 
June 7, 2016); Avago Techs. Gen. IP (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Asustek Comput., Inc., No. 15-cv-04525, 2016 
WL 1623920, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016). Several district courts have flatly disagreed with that position. 
E.g., CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00801, 2017 WL 58572, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2017) 
(“The requirement of providing infringement contentions element-by-element under the Local Rules does not 
permit a more flexible application of Civil Rule 8(a) at the dismissal stage.”). 
337. Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No. 2:14-CV-0772, 2016 WL 199417, at *2 n.1 
(D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2016). As noted, the Federal Circuit has similarly left open the possibility that 
compliance with Form 18 remains sufficient to avoid a motion to dismiss. See supra note 328. For a 
scholarly argument that the deletion of the forms “cannot fairly be read as an invitation to make 
pleading standards more restrictive,” see Adam M. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil 
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 41 (2016). 
338. Cf. Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 143, 155 (2010) (suggesting that Iqbal and Twombly have had a similar effect on civil litigation 
more generally). 
339. In a thorough search, I have been able to locate six decisions in 2016 (out of eighteen granted motions 
to dismiss) in which a court dismissed claims with prejudice for insufficiently alleging direct infringement, and 
two of those with-prejudice dismissals were reversed on appeal. See Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., No. 
3:13-cv-819, 2016 WL 5724451, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016), rev’d, 869 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 
Howard v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:16CV127, 2016 WL 4077260, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 29, 2016); Nu-You 
Techs., LLC v. Beauty Town Int’l Inc., No. 3:15-CV-3433, 2016 WL 4717991, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2016); 
Ruby Sands LLC v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Tex., No. 2:15-cv-1955, 2016 WL 3542430, at *5 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 
2016); Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp., 189 F. Supp. 3d 768, 779 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Atlas IP, LLC 
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Nalco Co. v. Chem–Mod, LLC, No. 
14-cv-2510, 2016 WL 1594966, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2016), rev’d, No. 2017-1036, 2018 WL 1055851 (Fed. 
Cir. Feb. 27, 2018). In a few additional cases, the dismissal was not explicitly with prejudice, but the district 
court litigation concluded shortly after the dismissal. See, e.g., Disc Disease Sols,, Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., No. 
1:15-cv-188, 2016 WL 6561566, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2016), appeal filed, No. 2017-1483 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 
2017). 
340. See, e.g., Lifetime Indus., 2016 WL 5724451, at *1; Nalco, 2016 WL 1594966, at *1; Atlas IP, 
189 F. Supp. 3d at 773. 
341. See, e.g., Nu-You, 2016 WL 4717991, at *1. 
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It is therefore possible that the deletion of Form 18 has actually increased 
process costs—by incentivizing defendants to file motions they would not have 
previously filed and by requiring plaintiffs to engage in additional fact gathering 
and pleading—without concluding cases any more quickly or accurately. As 
Figure 3 below illustrates, the number of district court decisions on motions to 
dismiss direct infringement claims ticked up significantly in 2016, the first full 
year without Form 18, but grant rates slightly declined.342 
In a similar vein, many empirical studies of Twombly and Iqbal have found no statistically 
significant change in the proportion of cases granting motions to dismiss with prejudice, though it is of 
course possible that parties have changed their behavior in light of the changed pleading standards. See 
Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2306 (2012); see also William H.J. Hubbard, The Empirical 
Effects of Twombly and Iqbal 6–7 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 774, Aug. 
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820300 [https://perma.cc/V94K-D7HW] (collecting empirical stud­
ies on the effects of Twombly and Iqbal). 
(Note that Figure 3 
includes only motions to dismiss based on the insufficiency of direct infringe­
ment allegations.343 Motions to dismiss based on eligibility grounds, the topics 
of Figures 1 and 2, are excluded.) Again, however, it is worth noting that the 
population size is small and the timeframe is limited, so we should be cautious 
about drawing conclusions about any trends being illustrated. 
Figure 3. Motions to Dismiss Direct Infringement Claims 
342. 
343. To obtain the data, I again used Docket Navigator’s motion success tool, see supra note 265, 
running the following search: (1) Type of court document: motion to dismiss—failure to state a claim; 
(2) Order filed date: January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2016, inclusive; (3) Legal issue: direct 
infringement (and all subcategories). 
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One important step in leveraging the deletion of Form 18 to reduce litigation 
costs would be for the Federal Circuit to provide clarity on what, exactly, 
plaintiffs must allege in their complaints about the defendant’s infringement. 
Although some Federal Circuit judges have recognized the difficulty of assess­
ing infringement at the pleadings stage,344 
See Jimmy Hoover, ComEd Appeal ‘Pain in the Ass,’ Fed. Cir. Judge Says, LAW360 (Mar. 9, 
2017, 8:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/900177/comed-appeal-pain-in-the-ass-fed-circ-judge­
says [https://perma.cc/4G9Z-LQJD] (describing oral argument in Atlas IP, LLC v. Commonwealth 
Edison Co., in which Judge Moore “expressed frustration that her three-judge panel had to sift through 
in-depth claim construction issues . . .  when the lower court never ruled on those issues”). 
the court has thus far declined to 
elaborate on the post-Form 18 pleading standard.345 Under Twombly and Iqbal, 
a patentee must plead facts that would plausibly establish a claim under the 
relevant substantive law. To prove a claim of direct patent infringement, a 
patentee must demonstrate the presence of each element of the patent claim or 
each element’s equivalent in the accused product or process.346 Taking those 
legal principles as given, it would seem that a complaint for direct infringement 
should, at minimum, identify the patent claims being asserted, identify the 
accused product or process, and provide a description of how the accused 
product or process meets the patent’s claim limitations.347 
That may seem like too much detail to demand in a pleading. Civil procedure 
scholars have criticized Twombly and Iqbal for precisely that reason.348 Yet, in 
many patent cases (unlike, say, civil rights cases), the information the plaintiff 
must plead is not exclusively in the possession of the defendant. Often, the 
defendant sells an allegedly infringing product that the plaintiff can purchase, 
describe, and compare its patent claims to in the complaint. Because asymmet­
ric information is not a major concern in patent cases, the risk of erroneous 
dismissal from stricter screening does not seem terribly high. Indeed, cases such 
as the “TV Channel” case discussed above appear to involve infringement 
claims that objectively lack merit.349 And because dismissal on the pleadings is 
344. 
345. See Atlas IP, LLC v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(affirming a dismissal with prejudice for failure to adequately allege direct infringement but providing 
no substantive analysis of the complaint); Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (reversing a dismissal with prejudice for failure to adequately allege direct infringe­
ment, noting that “we need not resolve the question whether there is a difference between [the Form 18 
and Twombly/Iqbal] standards here because, as we explain, the [complaint] met the Iqbal/Twombly 
standard for pleading direct infringement”). 
346. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
347. For a more general exploration of how, after Twombly and Iqbal, the specificity required in a 
complaint may turn on “the substantive contours of the plaintiff’s claim,” see Adam N. Steinman, The 
Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 383 (2016). 
348. See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65  
STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204 n.6 (2013) (collecting commentary). 
349. In contrast with the “thick” screening that would allow for dismissal of claims that are weak but 
not frivolous, Bob Bone has termed this type of screening “thin” screening, which allows dismissal 
when “liability turns on objective facts about the defendant’s conduct and the defendant in fact did not 
act in the required way.” See Bone, supra note 290, at 870; see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, 
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 900 (2009) (exploring the 
potential normative justifications for a thin screening approach). 
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usually without prejudice, the patentee will receive multiple opportunities to 
adequately allege infringement. Patentees who cannot do so after multiple tries 
would seem to be those with the least meritorious claims in the first place. 
To be sure, over the long term, if courts grant motions to dismiss too 
enthusiastically, weakened patent rights could harm innovation incentives. So it 
is important to recognize that Twombly and Iqbal give district judges substantial 
discretion in reviewing the sufficiency of complaints.350 It may be appropriate 
for courts to demand less detail in complaints in biotechnology cases, for 
instance, where patent infringement often occurs in research or production 
facilities to which a patentee does not have access. By contrast, more detailed 
pleadings may be called for when dealing with multi-component electronics. In 
those cases, the product is usually available for purchase and inspection, and a 
manufacturer accused of infringement needs to know exactly which aspect of its 
product is alleged to infringe so it can immediately involve the correct supplier 
in the litigation. In the rarer cases where particular information about the 
accused product or process is potentially dispositive but exclusively in the 
defendant’s possession, courts could use their discretion to order limited, plead­
ings-stage discovery.351 Lastly, courts can reduce pleadings-stage process costs 
by allowing the patentee to clarify its infringement allegations through briefing 
on the motion to dismiss rather than formalistically demanding that the patentee 
amend and refile its complaint.352 
In sum, unlike AIA proceedings and the invigorated eligibility requirement, 
which have indisputably facilitated quicker decisions, the deletion of Form 18 
seems to present merely the potential for quick decisions. It may in fact have 
thus far had the paradoxical effect of increasing litigation costs and slowing 
cases down. The deletion of that form, however, could certainly be leveraged to 
render speedier—but still accurate—decisions in cases in which the patent 
owner’s claim of infringement plainly lacks merit. 
B. OTHER TYPES OF QUICK DECISIONS 
To this point, I have focused on changes in the law that allow patent suits to 
be resolved before discovery begins because that is the point at which litigation 
expenses begin to escalate significantly. But several other recent developments 
in patent law allow cases to be resolved earlier in the dispute process, even if 
they do not enable the parties to avoid discovery altogether. 
350. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states 
a plausible claim for relief will . . . be  a  context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 
on its judicial experience and common sense.”). 
351. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery 
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 69 
(2010). 
352. See, e.g., Danfoss Power Sols. Inc. v. DeltaTech Controls, No. 16-CV-3111, slip op. at 1–2 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 7, 2017). 
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1. Claim Construction 
Although it is now two decades old, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. facilitates quicker decisions by mandat­
ing that the judge, not the jury, interpret the claims of the patent.353 A jury could 
not issue its view of the meaning of the patent’s claims until after trial, but 
judges can—and usually do—decide claim construction before trial, typically 
during or at the close of discovery. Judicial claim construction often leads 
directly to summary judgment, particularly on the issue of infringement when 
there is no dispute about the nature or operation of the accused infringer’s 
product or process.354 
Even today, Markman continues to open new avenues of quick resolution. 
For instance, in a 2014 decision, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the 
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s stringent test for showing that a 
patent is invalid as indefinite.355 Indefiniteness is a matter of claim construction, 
so Nautilus, coupled with Markman, should facilitate quicker judicial decisions 
of indefiniteness.356 
The Federal Circuit’s 2015 en banc ruling on functional claiming, Williamson 
v. Citrix Online, LLC, also facilitates quicker, case-dispositive decisions on 
matters related to claim construction.357 At issue in that case was section 112(f) 
of the Patent Act, which allows a patent claim limitation to be drafted as a 
“means . . . for  performing a specified function” without reciting structure to 
perform that function.358 The scope of a limitation drafted in that format is, 
under the statute, limited to the structures described in the patent’s specifica­
tion.359 If the specification does not disclose structure for performing the 
claimed function, then the patent claim is invalid as indefinite.360 The Federal 
Circuit had previously made it difficult to invalidate a patent under that doc­
trine, holding that if a claim did not expressly use the term “means” there was a 
353. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
354. See Meurer, supra note 235, at 534–35. 
355. 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Under the Federal Circuit’s abrogated rule, a patent claim was 
invalid only if it was “insolubly ambiguous.” Id. The Supreme Court, by contrast, held that “a patent is 
invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification . . . and  the  prosecution history, 
fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Id. 
356. That said, many district courts, with the Federal Circuit’s blessing, allow juries to decide 
indefiniteness, so the increase in speed is not entirely certain. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll 
Med. Corp., 656 F. App’x 504, 527–28 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (vacating jury verdict of no indefinite­
ness because the jury instruction was based on pre-Nautilus law and remanding for another jury trial). 
The confusion surrounding the allocation of decision-making authority on indefiniteness is well 
illustrated by a recent Federal Circuit decision emphasizing that, because indefiniteness is a matter of 
claim construction, it reviews the district court’s decision de novo (as if it were a question of law), but 
also noting that the accused infringer must prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence (a 
heightened standard of proof that would normally apply only to a question of fact). Sonix Tech. Co. v. 
Pubs. Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
357. 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). 
358. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
359. Id. 
360. Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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“strong” presumption that section 112(f) did not apply and, therefore, no 
disclosure of structure was required.361 In Williamson, the court overturned that 
case law, ruling that, to determine if section 112(f) applies, the court should 
simply ask “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for 
structure.”362 
The decision to apply section 112(f) and whether to invalidate a patent under 
that provision are both questions of claim construction for the judge.363 Thus, 
Williamson’s embrace of a broader applicability of section 112(f) should, like 
many other developments discussed in this Article, make it easier to invalidate 
patents early in a case.364 That said, as I have argued elsewhere, most patent 
claims that contain functional language also contain limitations that a court 
could plausibly identify as structure to avoid applying section 112(f).365 At 
most, then, Williamson offers courts discretion to invoke section 112(f) as a 
mechanism for a quick decision. 
A final development related to claim construction that facilitates quicker 
decisions is the demise of the doctrine of equivalents.366 The doctrine of 
equivalents permits the factfinder to expand the literal scope of the patent to find 
infringement by products or processes that are “insubstantially different” from 
the claimed invention.367 Since Markman, however, infringement claims under 
the doctrine of equivalents have increasingly failed.368 Although commentators 
disagree in the particulars about why that is so, they generally acknowledge that 
Markman played a key role by making judicial claim construction the center­
piece of patent litigation.369 Because the judge now determines the scope of the 
patent before trial, the judge is unlikely to allow the jury to effectively nullify 
361. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
362. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348–49. 
363. Id. at 1346. 
364. See, e.g., Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1368–71 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (invalidating a patent under Williamson on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed at 
the same time as the defendant’s opening claim construction brief). 
365. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Early Filing and Functional Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1223, 1239–41 
(2016). 
366. See Meurer, supra note 235, at 535. 
367. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (holding that “the 
doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the [patent] claim, not to the invention 
as a whole”). 
368. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59  
STAN. L. REV. 955, 978 (2007) (reporting that, in the three years before Markman was decided in 1996, 
patentees won 40% of doctrine of equivalents cases compared with 24% for various periods from 1999 
through 2005). 
369. See id.; Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1371, 1401–02 (2010) (noting that substantive changes also made it more difficult to establish 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1160 (2011) (also highlighting the role of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc), which adopted a de novo standard of review for claim construction). 
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the claim construction ruling by finding infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
Although Markman and its progeny have certainly facilitated quick decisions 
that can end patent cases, the overall cost savings of those developments are not 
beyond dispute. By putting claim construction in the hands of the judge, 
Markman requires the parties to devote substantial resources to litigating claim 
meaning before or concurrent with summary judgment. On that view, Markman 
may have simply shifted litigation over claim meaning (and its attendant costs) 
to an earlier stage of the case.370 Moreover, some observers have suggested that 
the rules of judicial claim construction developed by the Federal Circuit in the 
wake of Markman, which divorce the scope of patent rights from the patentee’s 
actual invention, contributed to the rise of trolls, which has arguably increased 
patent litigation overall.371 But even if the broader consequences of Markman 
are not entirely clear, the decision has unquestionably allowed the often­
dispositive issue of claim meaning to be resolved earlier in any given case. 
2. Local Patent Rules 
In recent years, numerous federal district courts have adopted local proce­
dural rules, often for the express purpose of speeding up historically slow-
moving patent litigation.372 In 2000, the Northern District of California became 
the first district to adopt local patent rules. Thirty districts now have them, and 
they cover all aspects of pre-trial procedure, including the timing and sequence 
of discovery,373 the process of claim construction,374 and even, in one district, 
pleading requirements.375 
Many features of local patent rules facilitate quick decisions, or at least quick 
resolutions. For example, some districts’ rules (along with individual judges’ 
standing orders) impose early deadlines for document production376 
See La Belle, supra note 372, at 100; see also Eastern District of Texas, Sample Discovery 
Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney Gilstrap and Judge Roy Payne 2–3, http://www.txed. 
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judgeFiles/Discovery_Order_for_Patent_Cases_%282016-11-04%29_0. 
docx [https://perma.cc/5MFV-79PQ] (requiring the parties to produce all documents “that are relevant 
to the pleaded claims or defenses involved in this action” with their initial disclosures “[w]ithout 
awaiting a discovery request”). 
and for the 
370. Cf. Ashtor, supra note 178, at 219–20 (finding, from 2004 to 2011, a “significant increase” in 
patent litigation complexity as measured by case duration and the number of docket entries, motions, 
and orders, attributing the increase to the discovery and claim construction phases). 
371. See Greg Reilly, Patent “Trolls” and Claim Construction, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1045, 1062 
(2016). 
372. For a thorough description and analysis of those rules, see Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules 
of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63 (2015). 
373. E.g., N.D. ILL. PAT. R. 2.1. 
374. E.g., E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 4-2 to 4-6. 
375. D.N.H. PAT. R. 2.1(a) (requiring a complaint for patent infringement to include “a list of all 
products or processes (by model number, trade name, or other specific identifying characteristic) for 
which the claimant . . . has  developed a good-faith basis for alleging infringement, as of the time of 
filing the pleading” and “at least one illustrative asserted patent claim (per asserted patent) for each 
accused product or process”). 
376. 
672 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 106:619 
parties to exchange infringement and validity contentions.377 
See Travis Jensen, Infringement Contentions Summary Chart, LOCAL PAT. RULES, http://www. 
localpatentrules.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Chart%20Infringement%20Contentions.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/69NT-SVY5]. 
Those deadlines, 
coupled with Markman’s recasting of claim construction as a question for the 
judge, help speed cases toward claim construction and summary judgment. 
Compelled information exchange about the merits of the case is also thought to 
facilitate settlement,378 building on the mandatory initial disclosures introduced 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1990s.379 In addition, many local 
rules mandate settlement conferences—sometimes more than one—often in 
front of a magistrate judge,380 which can also lead to quicker resolution of the 
case. And some local rules complement early deadlines for disclosure by 
providing specific, relatively quick trial dates.381 
In the District of Delaware, which does not have local patent rules but in 
2016 heard the second most patent cases of any district, the judges have 
individually adopted numerous procedures designed to resolve cases more 
quickly. Many of those procedures were inspired by the district’s “Patent Study 
Group,” which recommended that judges “help identify weaker cases and end 
them early,” set a trial date “at the beginning of the case and keep it,” and 
“issu[e] decisions,” particularly claim construction decisions, “quickly.”382 
Chad Stover, Another Delaware Judge Outlines New Patent Case Practices, LAW360 (May 19, 
2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/539183/another-delaware-judge-outlines-new-patent­
case-practices [https://perma.cc/6NCV-QM74]. 
The 
procedures include: setting an initial case management conference as soon as 
any defendant files an answer (as opposed to waiting until any motions to 
dismiss are resolved),383 
Hon. Leonard P. Stark, District of Delaware, Revised Procedures for Managing Patent Cases 5 
(June 18, 2014), http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/LPS/PatentProcs/LPS-Patent 
Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY8Q-KD7V]. 
providing for early Markman hearings on case disposi­
tive claim terms,384 indicating a willingness to limit the number of claims 
asserted,385 
E.g., Hon. Sue L. Robinson, District of Delaware, Patent Case Scheduling Order 4–5 (Feb. 5, 
2015), http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/SLR/Forms/Sched-Order-Patent2-05­
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L27-QLYG]. 
and setting a trial date in the initial case scheduling order.386 
377. 
378. See Robert G. Bone, Discovery, in PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 188, 192 (Chris William 
Sanchirico ed., 2012). 
379. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2053 (3d ed. 2017). 
380. See, e.g., D. NEV. LOCAL PAT. R. 1-19 (requiring settlement conferences to take place (1) before 
claim construction, (2) after claim construction, and (3) before trial). 
381. See, e.g., S.D. OHIO PAT. R. 107.1 (setting the trial date at eighteen months after the initial 
scheduling conference). 
382. 
383. 
384. Id. at 8. 
385. 
386. E.g., Hon. Gregory M. Sleet, District of Delaware, Patent Scheduling Order 5 (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/GMS/Forms/Sched_Order_Patent_Rev02-25­
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/23MU-N87K]. 
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Although local rules and individual judges’ practices (sometimes termed 
“local-local rules”387) facilitate quicker decisions, those decisions are, like an 
early claim construction order that leads to summary judgment, not necessarily 
cheap. Early disclosure deadlines, for instance, require the parties to undertake 
significant discovery efforts at a time when a motion to dismiss may be under 
consideration or the defendant may be preparing a petition for inter partes 
review and seeking a stay of the litigation.388 Accordingly, proposals have 
percolated in Congress that would require courts to stay discovery until prelimi­
nary motions are resolved389 or until the judge issues the claim construction 
order.390 Those proposals would reduce litigation in some cases but prolong 
proceedings in many others. Some observers have suggested that litigation 
delays are less harmful to patentees today because patentees who win infringe­
ment suits are no longer presumptively entitled to injunctive relief.391 A paten­
tee who must wait an additional year to receive damages, the thinking goes, is 
not harmed nearly as much as a patentee who must endure an additional year of 
competition from an infringing competitor.392 But nearly 75% of successful 
patentees still obtain permanent injunctions, and that figure increases to 80% 
when patentees who do not practice their patents are excluded.393 A potentially 
more nuanced alternative to automatically staying discovery would be for 
district judges to more generously exercise the discretion they already have to 
pause proceedings when there is a preliminary motion pending that will substan­
tially impact, if not resolve, the case.394 
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Patent Litigation Reform, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS 
ONLINE, at 11–12 (2017), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.00 
1.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-15?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/WP5B-J444]. 
3. Declaratory Judgments 
Although most of the examples of legal changes that facilitate quick deci­
sions end litigation earlier, recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions 
about declaratory judgments make it possible for disputes to get into court more 
quickly. By statute, the federal courts may hear declaratory judgment claims 
only when there is an “actual controversy” between the parties.395 For many 
years, the Federal Circuit held that an actual controversy existed only when the 
potential infringer had a reasonable apprehension it was about to be sued for 
387. See La Belle, supra note 372, at 66 (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49  
ALA. L. REV. 51, 56 (1997)). 
388. See Love & Yoon, supra note 197, at 23. 
389. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, § 3(d)(1), 114th Cong. (2015). 
390. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, § 3(d)(1), 113th Cong. (2013). 
391. See Lichtman, supra note 190, at 438–39 (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
392. See id. at 445–46. Indeed, prejudgment interest can compensate for any delay in awarding 
damages. See id. at 439–40. 
393. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical 
Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983, 1988 (2016). 
394. 
395. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
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infringement.396 But the Supreme Court, in its 2007 decision in MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., rejected that restrictive test and adopted a more flexible 
standard that looks at “all the circumstances” to determine whether there is a 
sufficiently concrete dispute to warrant a declaratory judgment.397 
This new standard allows potential infringers to seek a declaratory judgment 
earlier—before the dispute has escalated to threats of litigation. For instance, in 
the Federal Circuit’s leading case applying MedImmune, the patentee had 
explicitly stated that it did not intend to file suit.398 Yet the court held that an 
oral presentation and written analysis alleging infringement, during the course 
of licensing negotiations, were sufficient to create the required controversy.399 
In a later case, the court made clear that a party may file a declaratory judgment 
suit even when the patentee has not “affirmatively accused” it of infringe­
ment.400 And, in one recent case, the Federal Circuit held that an actual 
controversy existed even though the patentee never referenced—and, indeed, 
did not know about—the specific products that were potentially infringing.401 
These decisions lowering the bar for standing make it easier for potential 
infringers to get into court.402 But the effects on litigation costs are complex 
because relaxing the standing requirement probably encourages more litigation. 
For example, a patentee who wants to choose the forum might simply sue for 
infringement rather than writing a letter that could trigger the accused infringer 
to file a declaratory judgment action in an unfavorable venue. Moreover, there 
are probably cases on the margins where, but for the recent relaxation of the 
standing requirement, there might have been no litigation at all because the 
parties would have negotiated a settlement. Thus, although changes to the law 
of declaratory judgment standing facilitate quicker decisions on validity, the 
effects on overall costs are complex, as with most other mechanisms of quick 
decisions discussed in this Article. 
4. Additional Mechanisms of Quick Decisions 
Although many other legal developments have facilitated speedy decisions in 
patent cases, I hope by now to have made the basic point. For the sake of 
completeness, I will conclude with three final examples that warrant at least 
brief mention. 
The first involves proceedings at the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(ITC). Under section 337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC has the power to issue 
396. See, e.g., Gen–Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
397. 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
398. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
399. Id. at 1382. 
400. Danisco U.S. Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 744 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
401. Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S, 837 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
402. For an argument that, even after MedImmune, the Federal Circuit has continued to make it too 
difficult for certain litigants to challenge patents, see Gaia Bernstein, The End User’s Predicament: 
User Standing in Patent Litigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1929, 1937–38 (2016). 
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exclusion orders that prohibit importing goods that infringe a U.S. patent.403 
ITC proceedings move quickly compared to patent litigation in court, conclud­
ing in about seventeen months on average.404 Also, unlike litigation in court, 
ITC proceedings are not stayed for PTAB proceedings. The ITC’s speed is 
attractive to patentees. It has contributed to the growth of the Commission’s 
patent caseload from about ten cases per year in the late 1990s to roughly fifty 
cases per year today.405 
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, NUMBER OF SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS INSTITUTED BY CALENDAR 
YEAR, http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/cy_337_institutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/S 
88T-QYJ4]; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 STATISTICS: NUMBER OF NEW, COMPLETED, AND 
ACTIVE INVESTIGATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/337_statistics_ 
number_new_completed_and_active.htm [https://perma.cc/MT49-FC95] (last updated July 14, 2017). 
To be sure, some of that growth is also due to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which made it more difficult for plaintiffs who do not 
practice their patent to obtain an injunction in federal court. See Seaman, supra note 393, at 1952. 
Although the ITC cannot award damages for infringement, it enters an exclusion order—effectively, an 
injunction against future infringement if the infringing product is imported from abroad—in practically 
every case in which the patentee prevails. See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the 
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (2012). 
Second, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR made 
clear that obviousness, though a fact-intensive question, can be amenable to 
summary judgment.406 Before KSR, the Federal Circuit had held that its “teach­
ing, suggestion, or motivation” test was a question of fact, meaning that the 
crucial issue of obviousness frequently “could not be decided without a multimil­
lion dollar jury trial.”407 In KSR, the Court stated that many of the key inquiries 
in the obviousness analysis are to be made by the “court,” hinting at a reduced 
role for the jury in obviousness disputes.408 Empirical evidence suggests that, 
since KSR, the Federal Circuit has been more deferential to district court 
summary judgment rulings of obviousness than it was before the Supreme 
Court’s decision,409 suggesting that the judge—not a jury—is more commonly 
being allowed to have the final word on the issue. 
403. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). 
404. See Kumar, supra note 203, at 536–37. Before 1994, section 337 imposed fixed time limits that 
required proceedings to conclude within one year, or eighteen months in more complicated cases, 19 
U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988), but those time limits were found to violate the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. See Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is Section 337 Consistent with the GATT 
and the TRIPs Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 459, 475–81 (2002). 
405. 
406. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1239–40 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (post-KSR decision 
emphasizing that the question of motivation to combine, a factual determination underpinning the obviousness 
analysis, can be appropriate for resolution on summary judgment, particularly when “the existence of a 
motivation to combine references . . .  boil[s] down to a question of ‘common sense’”). 
407. John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure in the 
Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 36–37 (2007). 
408. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417–18 (2007) (“[A] court must ask whether the 
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established 
functions[;] . . .  a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would employ.” (emphasis added)). 
409. See Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical 
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 745 tbl.5 (2013) (reporting a post-KSR affirmance rate of 80%, 
compared to a 56% affirmance rate in the ten years before the Court granted review). 
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Finally, Congress in the past few decades has created two sui generis regimes 
designed to encourage the expeditious assertion and resolution of patent litiga­
tion in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. In 1984, Congress 
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,410 com­
monly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, which allows the prospective distribu­
tor of a generic pharmaceutical product to engage in an “artificial” act of 
infringement by sending a written notice (often called a “paragraph IV certifica­
tion,” in reference to the applicable subsection of the Act) to the patentee 
asserting that its patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. The para­
graph IV certification gives the patentee forty-five days to file an infringement 
suit or else the generic company may enter the market.411 To encourage generic 
companies to challenge patents, the Act grants 180 days of market exclusivity to 
the first generic company to file a paragraph IV certification.412 
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2009413 
created a broadly similar regime for expediting resolution of patent disputes 
related to biological drugs.414 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court further 
facilitated quick resolution of disputes under the BPCIA by holding that the 
biosimilar applicant may provide the patentee with the notice that can trigger an 
infringement suit before the Food and Drug Administration approves the biosimi­
lar product.415 (The Federal Circuit had previously held that the notice could be 
provided only after agency approval.416) Thus, both the Hatch–Waxman Act and 
the BPCIA share a purpose consistent with the general trend toward quick 
resolution of patent infringement claims.417 
IV. QUICK DECISIONS IN THE FUTURE 
As the discussion above demonstrates, many recent developments in patent 
law can be understood as providing mechanisms to increase speed to decision. 
Those changes have the potential to significantly improve the patent system. 
AIA proceedings and motions to dismiss on eligibility grounds, for example, 
provide new mechanisms for resolving infringement disputes before discovery, 
410. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
411. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012). 
412. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). Whether that provision has, in fact, incentivized successful patent 
challenges is a matter of some debate. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: 
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch–Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 953–55 (2011). 
413. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804. 
414. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012). 
415. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1677 (2017). 
416. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
417. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013) (noting that “[t]he Hatch–Waxman 
process . . .  ‘speed[s] the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market’” and that the paragraph IV 
certification “often ‘means provoking litigation’” (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk 
A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 406 (2012) (second alteration in original)); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner/Cross-Respondent 3, Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. 1664, 2017 WL 2507337 (“The 
BPCIA facilitates early resolution of patent claims by establishing a so-called ‘artificial’ patent-
infringement claim . . .  .”). 
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something that is particularly useful in deterring low-merit litigation. Yet the 
overall cost savings of this trend is not beyond doubt. Quick decisions may 
result in erroneous patent invalidations and may incentivize litigation about 
issues, such as pleading sufficiency, that were not previously disputed. More­
over, although many of the recent changes allow defendants to avoid liability 
for infringement, they offer little help to patentees seeking quick adjudication of 
meritorious claims. One might therefore be tempted to dismiss the trend toward 
quick decisions as simply part of an emerging shift to an era of weaker patent 
rights.418 Yet viewing patent law through the lens of speed to decision can teach 
lessons that transcend the pro-patent/anti-patent divide. 
A. MERELY AN ANTI-PATENT MOMENT? 
Without a doubt, many mechanisms of quick decisions favor accused infring­
ers. Only an infringer can win a case through a motion to dismiss on eligibility 
grounds. Markman’s separation of claim construction from trial creates an 
additional stage at which a defendant can prevail.419 KSR’s invigoration of the 
nonobviousness requirement favors accused infringers, too. 
But the pro- or anti-patent valence of the trend toward quick decisions is 
arguably more nuanced. Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions, the 
grant rate of motions to dismiss on eligibility grounds seems to be falling, 
perhaps providing a preliminary indication that those invalidations are increas­
ingly confined to the weakest patents or that very weak patents are no longer 
being asserted in litigation. As for the supposedly deadly AIA proceedings, 
recall that the PTAB institutes review of fewer than half of all challenged patent 
claims, and it invalidates only about a quarter of challenged claims.420 
The speed engendered by local patent rules can favor patentees by coercing 
the defendant to settle rather than risk an uncertain outcome before a jury.421 A 
quick settlement or a speedy trial or can “allow a patentee to build a war chest 
to sue other defendants, and, in the case of trial, build the reputation of the 
patent.”422 Indeed, the Eastern District of Texas became the favorite venue for 
418. On the tendency of patent law to cycle between pro-patent and anti-patent eras, see Mark A. 
Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2016). The prior, 
pro-patent era commenced in the early 1980s and was itself a response to the era of weak patent rights 
that spanned the 1960s and 1970s. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989). 
419. Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law 504, 506, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). 
420. See PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 12–13; Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 252–58 (challenging 
the argument that invalidity rates at the PTAB are too high); cf. Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 
56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 926–31 (2015) (raising concerns about high invalidity rates in AIA proceedings, 
but also noting the limitations of the available data). 
421. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 677 
(2015). 
422. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 13 (2010); see also Silicon 
Valley: The Patent Troll (HBO television broadcast June 4, 2017). In the show, Pied Piper, the startup 
run by the show’s protagonist, Richard Hendricks, was targeted by a patent troll shortly after Pied 
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patentees not because its substantive rulings were particularly pro-patentee, but 
because of procedural doctrines and practices that enhanced patentees’ bargain­
ing power in settlement negotiations.423 The fast proceedings and the nearly 
automatic exclusion orders available at the ITC also favor patentees.424 
In addition, the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions have neither uni­
formly facilitated quick decisions nor uniformly favored accused infringers. A 
notable example favoring patentees and potentially extending the duration of 
litigation is the Court’s 2016 decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electron­
ics, Inc., which made it easier for a patentee to recover enhanced damages for 
willful infringement.425 The Court also removed from the enhanced damages 
analysis a threshold question of law about the objective merits of the defen­
dant’s case that had previously been determined by the judge, typically on 
summary judgment. Instead, the Court held that the decision to award enhanced 
damages is ultimately a matter of the district court’s discretion.426 
To guide that discretion, the Court noted that “[t]he sort of conduct warranting enhanced 
damages has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, 
consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.” Id. at 1932. On the standard for 
awarding enhanced damages after Halo, see generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945696 [https://perma.cc/9WSR­
TQB5]. 
Conse­
quently, the issue of willfulness will likely get past summary judgment and go 
to the jury more frequently.427 If the jury finds willfulness, then the judge has 
the power to make the ultimate, discretionary decision about whether to award 
enhanced damages.428 In several recent decisions, including in Halo itself on 
remand, judges have declined to award enhanced damages despite a jury finding 
of willfulness.429 A more efficient process—and one that is arguably consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Halo—would put the power to award 
enhanced damages entirely in the hands of the judge.430 
Piper’s data compression application appeared on a list of the 500 most downloaded apps on the Hooli 
app store (counting utility apps only, in subgroup mobile and subgroup storage—a feat that, as Pied 
Piper’s head of business development noted with perhaps a little too much satisfaction, put the 
company’s app “firmly” in the top 30,000 overall). When asked about the troll, Hendricks’s lawyer 
explained that the patentee in question “starts at the bottom of those lists and works his way up; the 
more settlements he gets the stronger his case; the higher you are on the list, the more money he asks 
for.” 
423. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 250 (2016). 
424. See supra note 405. 
425. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
426. 
427. See, e.g., Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., 240 F. Supp. 3d 605, 618 (E.D. 
Tex. 2017) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation) (denying motion for summary judgment of no willfulness 
despite objective evidence favorable to the defendant, criticizing the defendant for “offer[ing] no . . .  sum­
mary judgment evidence going to the subjective beliefs of its decisionmakers”), appeal filed, No. 
2017-2603 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2017). 
428. See Karshtedt, supra note 426, at 67. 
429. See id. at 71 n.577 (citing, among other cases, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 
2:07-cv-00331, 2017 WL 3896672, at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2017)). 
430. See Michael Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, “Characteristic of a Pirate”: Willfulness and Treble 
Damages 3 (Stanford Public Law, Working Paper No. 2811773, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=28117 
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73 [https://perma.cc/DW7A-QTC3] (suggesting that, because the Supreme Court in Halo adopted an 
“abuse of discretion” standard of review, “the power to impose [enhanced] damages may now lie 
exclusively with the judge” (emphasis added)). 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland is more consistent 
with a general trend of favoring accused infringers, giving them hope of 
avoiding litigation in the patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas.431 But the 
decision will likely result in protracted pre-merits litigation and increase litiga­
tion costs. Previously, the venue rule in patent cases was, whatever its virtues or 
vices, quite clear: venue was proper in any district in which the defendant was 
subject to personal jurisdiction, which, for many corporations doing business 
nationwide, was any district in the country.432 Under TC Heartland, however, 
venue is proper only in the defendant’s place of incorporation or in any district 
“where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.”433 Although the Federal Circuit has recently 
begun to elaborate on what it means for a defendant to have a regular and 
established place of business in a particular district,434 the paucity of appellate 
case law on that fact-specific question means that it will likely take time—and 
litigation—for courts to bring some predictability to the issue.435 The fact-
specific nature of the venue question has already been used to justify wide-
ranging early-stage discovery into the defendant’s business activities in the 
forum.436 
Moreover, even after TC Heartland, accused infringers will continue to file 
motions to transfer venue for convenience purposes under 28 U.S.C. sec­
tion 1404(a), particularly in cases that are filed in the accused infringer’s place 
of incorporation but that bear no other connection to the district.437 In other 
words, after TC Heartland, defendants have not one but two mechanisms for 
challenging venue. First, they can argue that venue is improper because they are 
not incorporated in the plaintiff’s chosen district, have not committed acts of 
infringement there, and do not have a regular and established place of business 
there. Second, even if venue is proper, defendants can still seek transfer for 
convenience reasons under section 1404(a). Indeed, in many cases, defendants 
will be able to raise both of those arguments at the outset of the case, further 
431. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
432. See Gugliuzza & La Belle, supra note 17, at 1042–44. 
433. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
434. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
435. See id. (“In deciding whether a defendant has a regular and established place of business in a 
district, no precise rule has been laid down and each case depends on its own facts.”). 
436. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-007, 2017 WL 3389022, at *2 (D. Or. 
June 30, 2017) (granting a motion to compel discovery on, among other things, the defendant’s sales in 
the district, the activities of its third-party vendors and its relationships with those vendors, “the 
activities of [the defendant’s] agents, whether the agent is based in [the district] or not,” and the 
property owned or leased by the defendant in the district). 
437. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 
383–90 (2012) (discussing the use of section 1404(a) motions in patent litigation). 
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slowing down the initial stages of the litigation.438 
Thus, though many recent developments in patent law facilitate quick deci­
sions in favor of accused infringers, other developments may drag out litigation, 
increase costs, and, more rarely, favor patentees. 
B. WHAT CAN WE LEARN? 
Thinking about patent disputes in terms of speed to decision provides a useful 
way to evaluate recent changes to the substance of patent law because it 
provides an analytical vocabulary that transcends the usual pro-patent/anti­
patent divide. For instance, I showed above how some aspects of current 
eligibility doctrine are substantively problematic. The test for determining 
eligibility is vague and results can be unpredictable. As I also highlighted, 
however, a comprehensive critique of that doctrine must acknowledge the 
savings in litigation costs that stems from allowing courts to resolve validity on 
the pleadings. Going forward, one potential reform, which I explore in more 
detail in a forthcoming article,439 would be for courts to more clearly articulate 
the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact in the eligibility 
analysis. That clearer distinction would ensure that fact-driven questions of 
patentability are not resolved prematurely (and potentially erroneously) on an 
inadequate record, but still preserve the eligibility requirement as a mechanism 
to quickly invalidate patents for which there is no plausible case for patentability. 
In a similar vein, the new AIA proceedings, even if they are not perfectly 
accurate, have invalidated many patents that almost certainly did not comply 
with the requirements of the Patent Act. Yet the social benefit from clearing 
invalid patents is undermined by the costs of permitting the validity of a single 
patent to be reviewed by both the courts and the PTO. I discussed above various 
reforms that could help reduce the costs of concurrent proceedings, such as 
enhancing preclusive effects between the PTO and the courts and strengthening 
the rules of estoppel that foreclose certain arguments from being pursued in a 
subsequent proceeding.440 
Likewise, the deletion of the form complaint for patent infringement from the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been praised as offering defendants 
protection from frivolous claims of infringement. But that change may have 
simply increased litigation about the sufficiency of pleadings with minimal 
corresponding benefit in terms of dispositive dismissals of weak claims. One 
improvement in that area would be for the Federal Circuit to provide more 
guidance about what, precisely, a patentee needs to include in its complaint to 
438. See, e.g., Free-Flow Packaging Int’l Inc. v. Automated Packaging Sys., Inc., No. CV-17-6398, 
slip op. at 4, 9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017) (granting a motion to transfer to the Northern District of Ohio 
under section 1404(a) after the case had already been dismissed in the Northern District of California 
for improper venue and refiled in the Central District of California, where the defendant maintained a 
sales office (and hence had a “regular and established place of business”)). 
439. See Gugliuzza, supra note 308. 
440. See supra Section III.A.1. 
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avoid a motion to dismiss for failing to sufficiently allege direct infringement.441 
Finally, because the mechanisms of quick decisions that currently exist tend 
to favor accused infringers, we might consider adopting measures to facilitate 
quicker adjudication when a patentee has a clearly meritorious claim for 
infringement.442 The accused infringer’s Seventh Amendment jury trial right, 
however, presents a significant obstacle to such a reform.443 Absent dramatic 
changes to the relevant constitutional law, patentees may, unfortunately, have to 
be content with more modest reforms, such as local patent rules and greater 
clarity in pleading standards and eligibility law, that move meritorious cases 
toward trial more quickly. 
As I have discussed throughout this Article, the interaction between speed to 
decision, litigation costs, and decisional accuracy is complex. Understanding the 
enforcement-related complications that flow from changes in patent law can help the 
patent system strike a better balance between the ideal of patents as an incentive for 
innovation and the reality that bad patents and weak claims for infringement exist and 
should be amenable to quick disposition. Much of the current debate on the state of 
the patent system fixates on the seemingly unanswerable question of whether strong 
patents or weak patents are better for innovation.444 Considerations of decisional 
speed and enforcement costs provide a more neutral language for discussing patent 
law’s ongoing evolution. Discussing potential law reforms in those more neutral terms 
could help modulate the often-dramatic swings in substantive patent law between pro-
and anti-patent eras. 
CONCLUSION 
With a few exceptions, the trend in patent litigation, as in many areas of civil 
litigation, is toward quicker resolution. Generally speaking, this trend is a reasonable 
response to concerns that the PTO has issued too many patents that are invalid and 
that patentees can too easily use those patents to obtain unwarranted settlement 
payments. But not all quick decisions are cheap, and quick decisions may increase the 
risk of error. Recognizing the interplay between speed, cost, and accuracy is essential 
to any normative analysis of recent developments in patent law. 
441. See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying text. 
442. For a sketch of a regime that would permit accelerated final adjudication in favor of both 
plaintiffs and defendants, see Zuckerman, supra note 130, at 379–81 (drawing on the current system of 
preliminary injunction practice). 
443. Even if the Supreme Court were to rule that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
on the issue of patent validity, see supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text (discussing the Oil States 
case, which potentially presents that issue to the Supreme Court); see also Lemley, supra note 125, at 
1720 (raising doubts about whether a jury trial right exists on the issue of validity), the right to a jury 
trial on the issue of infringement is well-established. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 377 (1996) (“[T]here is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried before a jury, 
as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.”). 
444. Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 76–87 (2015) 
(summarizing the uncertainty over whether patents actually promote innovation and arguing that 
variations in patent policy across jurisdictions could help reduce that uncertainty). 
